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HANS-GEORG GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL  
HERMENEUTICS  IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
Beyond Modernism and Postmodernism 
Abstract 
The confrontation between modern and postmodern philosophical approaches is 
one of the most prominent and protracted academic debates of recent decades. In 
the philosophy of education, this debate has been ongoing since the 1980s and it 
continues to reverberate in contemporary discussions. One of the major themes 
of the debate is the endeavour of the modern philosophy of education to establish 
a universally valid rational foundation for educational theory and practice. This 
attempt has become a central target of criticism of the postmodern philosophies 
of education, which emphasize the contextual and situated nature of rationality 
and knowledge. As for the postmodern educational approaches, they have often 
been accused of giving rise to problematic forms of relativism. Rather than 
yielding fruitful solutions, the debate has largely resulted in an undesirable 
polarization between the modern and postmodern standpoints.  
This thesis seeks to take part in the discussion concerning the modernism-
postmodernism debate from the viewpoint of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1900–
2002) philosophical hermeneutics. The thesis consists of three interrelated 
studies that examine the relation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to some of the 
prominent representatives of modernism (Jürgen Habermas) and post-
modernism (John Caputo and Richard Rorty) from different perspectives. The 
common aim of these studies is to demonstrate that Gadamer’s philosophy is able 
to avoid some of the central philosophical problems and limitations associated 
with the aforementioned approaches and therefore it might also contribute to the 
movement beyond the unproductive modernism-postmodernism dichotomy in 
the philosophy of education.  
The studies particularly focus on the Gadamerian concepts of dialogical 
rationality and the truth of the subject matter (die Sache selbst), which represent 
an attempt to redefine the modernist notions of rationality and truth from a 
historically situated and postfoundationalist perspective. It is suggested in the 
thesis that through these concepts, Gadamer’s hermeneutics can provide 
education with orienting ideals and principles for the philosophical critique of 
educational practices without jeopardizing the hermeneutical awareness of the 
historicity and contextuality of knowledge. Accordingly, on the basis of these 
concepts, Gadamer’s philosophy circumvents both the foundationalist tendencies 
of the modern philosophies of education and the problems associated with such 
postmodern educational approaches that refrain from providing a justification for 
educational practices. Consequently, the study argues that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics offers a more defensible warrant for educational theory and practice 
than that provided by the modern and postmodern philosophies of education 
discussed in the thesis. 
Keywords: Gadamer, philosophical hermeneutics, the philosophy of education, 
modernism, postmodernism 
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HANS-GEORG GADAMERIN FILOSOFINEN  
HERMENEUTIIKKA KASVATUSFILOSOFIASSA 
Modernismin ja postmodernismin tuolle puolen 
Tiivistelmä 
Modernien ja postmodernien filosofisten näkökulmien välinen kiista on yksi 
viime vuosikymmenten näkyvimmistä ja pitkäkestoisimmista akateemisista eri-
mielisyyksistä. Kasvatusfilosofiassa kyseinen kiista nousi esiin erityisesti 1980- 
luvulla ja se heijastuu edelleen nykyisiin keskusteluihin. Yksi kiistan pääteemoista 
on moderniin kasvatusfilosofiaan liittyvä pyrkimys löytää kasvatuksen teorialle ja 
käytännölle universaalisti pätevä rationaalinen perusta. Tämä pyrkimys nousi 
postmodernien kasvatusfilosofioiden keskeiseksi kritiikin kohteeksi, sillä post-
modernissa ajattelussa korostetaan tiedon ja rationaalisuuden kontekstuaalista 
luonnetta. Postmoderneja kasvatusfilosofioita puolestaan on usein syytetty siitä, 
että ne johtavat ongelmallisiin relativismin muotoihin. Rakentavien ratkaisujen 
sijaan modernismin ja postmodernismin välinen kiista on enimmäkseen johtanut 
hedelmättömään vastakkainasetteluun näiden kasvatusfilosofisten lähestymista-
pojen välillä.  
Tämä väitöskirja osallistuu modernismin ja postmodernismin välistä kiistaa 
koskevaan kasvatusfilosofiseen keskusteluun Hans-Georg Gadamerin (1900–
2002) filosofisen hermeneutiikan näkökulmasta. Väitöskirja koostuu kolmesta 
toisiinsa liittyvästä osajulkaisusta, jotka tarkastelevat eri näkökulmista Gadame-
rin hermeneutiikan suhdetta modernismin (Jürgen Habermas) ja postmodernis-
min (John Caputo ja Richard Rorty) keskeisiin nykyedustajiin. Osajulkaisujen 
yhteisenä tavoitteena on osoittaa, että Gadamerin hermeneutiikka välttää joitakin 
edellä mainittuihin filosofioihin liitettyjä keskeisiä ongelmia ja rajoitteita, ja näin 
ollen se voi tarjota mahdollisuuksia myös modernien ja postmodernien kasvatus-
filosofioiden välisen vastakkainasettelun ylittämiseen.  
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan erityisesti Gadamerin dialogisen rationaalisuu-
den ja “asian itsensä” (die Sache selbst) käsitteitä, jotka voidaan nähdä pyrkimyk-
senä määritellä uudelleen modernismille ominaiset rationaalisuuden ja totuuden 
käsitteet postfundamentalismin ja historiallisuuden näkökulmista. Väitöskirjassa 
osoitetaan, että näiden käsitteiden avulla Gadamerin hermeneutiikka voi tarjota 
suuntaavia ideaaleja kasvatukselle ja oppimiselle sekä perustan kasvatuksen käy-
tänteitä koskevalle kritiikille, luopumatta kuitenkaan tiedon historiallisuutta ja 
kontekstisidonnaisuutta koskevista oletuksistaan. Näin ollen Gadamerin herme-
neutiikka onnistuu välttämään sekä moderneille kasvatusfilosofioille ominaisen 
epistemologisen fundamentalismin että postmoderneille kasvatusfilosofioille tyy-
pilliset, kasvatuskäytänteiden oikeuttamiseen liittyvät ongelmat. Väitöskirjan joh-
topäätös on, että Gadamerin hermeneutiikka tarjoaa tutkimuksessa tarkasteltuja 
moderneja ja postmoderneja kasvatusfilosofioita perustellumman lähtökohdan 
kasvatuksen teorialle ja käytännölle.  
Asiasanat: Gadamer, filosofinen hermeneutiikka, kasvatusfilosofia, modernismi, 
postmodernismi   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The past few years that have led to the completion of my doctoral thesis have been 
filled with learning, hard work, inspiring encounters, minor and major epiphanies 
and experiences of disappointment and accomplishment. At times it feels that the 
process of writing this thesis has been a journey of exploration into myself rather 
than into Gadamer’s philosophy. However, what I am certain of is that I could not 
have carried out or completed this study on my own and therefore I would like to 
express my gratitude to the people and institutions that have helped and 
supported me in various ways during these years. 
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors Associate Professor Katariina 
Holma and Dr. Jussi Backman for their continuous guidance and support during 
my doctoral studies. Katariina has witnessed my journey from the earliest phases 
of this process to the completion of my thesis. She has always found the time to 
answer my questions and to comment on my manuscripts and her support has 
been of crucial importance to me. Among other things, Katariina has taught me to 
accept that philosophical work is always incomplete which, however, does not 
mean that one should not be proud of what has been accomplished so far. I admire 
her energy and competence as a scholar and appreciate the opportunity to have 
worked with her. Jussi became my supervisor in 2012 after which his wide-ranging 
knowledge and expertise in the fields of hermeneutics and continental philosophy 
has been an invaluable resource for my work. Jussi has been an exceptionally 
perceptive and thorough commentator of my work and I cannot emphasize 
enough the importance of his efforts particularly during the last few months of 
writing my thesis, when I was working under high pressure and on an extremely 
tight schedule. I would also like to thank Associate Professor Asger Sørensen for 
supervising my doctoral dissertation during the spring 2014, which I spent at the 
Danish school of Education in Copenhagen as a visiting doctoral student. I am 
grateful for his helpful comments on my thesis and I would also like to thank him 
for the motivating and interesting discussions that we had during my visit.  
During the period of writing my thesis, I have been extremely fortunate to be a 
part of a wonderful community of philosophers that has gathered every Friday to 
discuss phenomenology and other related fields of philosophy. I would like to 
express my gratitude to Professor Sara Heinämaa, Dr. Jussi Backman, Sanna 
Tirkkonen, Hanna Lukkari, Dr. Fredrik Westerlund, Dr. Joona Taipale, Simo 
Pulkkinen, Dr. Timo Miettinen, Dr. Erika Ruonakoski, Hermanni Yli-Tepsa, Juho 
Hotanen, Dr. Irina Poleshchuk, Marko Gylén, Dr. Martta Heikkilä, Risto Tiihonen 
and many others who have participated in the phenomenology seminar during the 
past years. I am deeply grateful to all of you for all the inspiring discussions and 
for your extremely helpful comments and suggestions on my work. Most of all, 
however, I would like to thank all of you for allowing me to participate in the best 
research seminar that I could hope for. I still remember the first time I left the 
seminar room thinking “So this is what a philosophical seminar can be like!” The 
combination of a supportive and encouraging atmosphere and the high quality of 
philosophical discussion still amazes me.  
Another research group that I have been lucky to be a part of is the one formed 
by Associate Professor Katariina Holma, Katariina Tiainen, Hanna-Maija Huhtala 
and myself. Especially during the years 2013 and 2014 the seminars and meetings 
with these fellow philosophers of education were a significant source of joy, 
inspiration and learning for me. I am particularly grateful to Katariina Tiainen for 
sharing with me the joys and sorrows of the life of a doctoral student. In this 
context, I would also like to thank Tarna Kannisto, Lauri Ojalehto and Dr. Eero 
Salmenkivi for participating in our seminars and meetings and for enriching our 
discussions. It has been a pleasure to be a part of this small but vibrant community 
of philosophers of education at the University of Helsinki.  
The programme of Education at the University of Oulu in which I completed 
my bachelor’s and master’s degrees is the source of my interest in the philosophy 
of education and the reason why I started to consider the career of a researcher in 
the first place. I am most grateful to Dr. Jouni Peltonen for his encouragement 
and friendship during my master’s studies and the early stages of my doctoral 
studies. I look back to our numerous inspiring discussions with gratitude. I also 
want to thank Jouni for his elaborate and insightful comments and suggestions on 
the manuscript of the first article of my thesis. I am also very grateful to Professor 
Pauli Siljander for the many recommendations that he wrote for my research grant 
applications during the first year of my doctoral studies. 
I would like to express my gratitude to the pre-examiners of my thesis, Senior 
Lecturer Pádraig Hogan (National University of Ireland Maynooth) and Professor 
Paul Fairfield (Queen’s University), for accepting the task of reading my thesis and 
for giving my work such encouraging and appreciative evaluations. I am 
particularly thankful to Dr. Hogan for the thorough reading of my thesis and the 
detailed comments and suggestions provided by him. These suggestions 
significantly helped me to improve my thesis. I would also like to thank Associate 
Professor Chris Higgins (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) for 
accepting the role of the Opponent at the public defence of my thesis. Accordingly, 
I thank Professor Sari Lindblom-Ylänne for accepting the role of the Custos at the 
defence.  
The following people have also concretely contributed to my thesis and 
therefore I would like to express my gratitude to them: I thank Lisa Muszynski 
and John Gage for the language revision of my thesis – especially in Lisa’s case I 
have been lucky to have a language reviser who has shown continuous interest in 
my work and provided me with helpful comments and suggestions concerning 
both the language and the content of my thesis. I am also grateful to Dr. Tobias 
Keiling for his help during the publication process of my International Yearbook 
for Hermeneutics article. I also want to thank Tuomo Aalto for the sophisticated 
final layout and graphic design of the thesis and Joonas Karjalainen for the cover 
photo. 
This thesis could not have been written without the financial support provided 
by the University of Helsinki, the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, Emil 
Aaltonen Foundation, Oskar Öflunds Stiftelse and the Chancellor’s Travel Fund. I 
would like to express my deepest gratitude to these organizations. I would also like 
to thank the Institute of Behavioural Sciences at the University of Helsinki for 
providing all the necessary facilities for my research and thus for making its 
realization possible. Moreover, I am also grateful to Wiley-Blackwell, Routledge 
and Mohr Siebeck for granting the permission to reprint the original publications 
as a part of the printed version of this thesis.  
My relationships with my dear friends Emilia Frantsi, Anu Niemelä, Salla 
Saarela, Minna Lumila, Anna Lepistö, Kristiina Kurki and Matleena Ruotsalainen 
have been and continue to be an enormous resource of energy, strength, joy and 
support in my life. It has been deeply comforting to know that although we all have 
grown and changed as persons and the circumstances of our lives have 
transformed in many ways since we have met, our friendships endure and grow 
with us. I am extremely fortunate and grateful to have such amazing women as my 
friends. I also want to thank my colleagues and friends Dr. Kaisu Mälkki and Antti 
Paakkari for bringing joy and laughter into my workdays and for providing the 
needed interruptions to them in the form of lunch and coffee breaks.  
My family members – my partner Joonas Karjalainen, my parents Leena and 
Tapio Leiviskä and my brother Timo Leiviskä – are the emotional bedrock of my 
life to whose love and support I have always been able to count on. My parents 
have always supported my studies both emotionally and materially and their home 
in Oulu has been an important refuge for me whenever I have needed a break from 
my work. Joonas has shown great support, patience and understanding during the 
past few years when my work has demanded more of my time and energy than 
either of us had expected. Without the help and support of my loved ones, writing 
this thesis would not have been possible. I dedicate this book to them.  
Helsinki, November 2015 
Anniina Leiviskä 

CONTENTS 
1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
1.1  Modernism and postmodernism in the philosophy of 
education ...................................................................................... 8 
1.2  Previous interpretations of Gadamer’s relation to modernism 
and postmodernism ................................................................... 12 
2  RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS .................................................. 17 
2.1  Research aims and questions ...................................................... 17 
2.2  Research method ........................................................................ 19 
2.3  Source literature ......................................................................... 22 
3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL 
HERMENEUTICS ............................................................................. 25 
3.1  Introduction to the central themes of Gadamer’s philosophy ... 25 
3.2  The historicity of understanding ................................................ 27 
3.3  The dialogical structure of understanding ................................. 33 
4  GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS IN DIALOGUE WITH 
MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM ......................................... 37 
4.1  Gadamer and Habermas’s critical theory................................... 37 
4.2  Gadamer and Caputo’s radical hermeneutics ............................ 45 
4.3  Gadamer and Rorty’s neopragmatism ....................................... 51 
5  BEYOND MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM ......................... 59 
5.1  The central findings of the studies ............................................. 59 
5.2  The relevance of the studies to the philosophy of education ..... 64 
5.3  Limitations and directions for future research .......................... 69 
6  CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................. 73 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 77 

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
 I Leiviskä, A. (2015). The Relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Concept of 
Tradition to the Philosophy of Education. Educational Theory, 65(5), 581–
600. 
II Leiviskä, A. (2015). Gadamer’s Dialogical Rationality. A Defence against 
Two Postmetaphysical Critiques. In G. Figal (Ed.), International Yearbook 
for Hermeneutics. Volume 14. Focus: The Space of Imagination / 
Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik. Band 14. Schwerpunkt: Der 
Raum der Einbildungskraft (pp. 281–304). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
III Leiviskä, A. (2013). Finitude, Fallibilism and Education towards Non-
dogmatism: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics in Science Education. Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 45(5), 516–530. 

1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The rise of postmodern philosophies in the late 1970s and early 1980s has 
generated one of the most prominent and protracted philosophical controversies 
of recent decades: the debate between modernism and postmodernism. In this 
debate, postmodernism has often been labelled as a radical form of philosophical 
nihilism that rejects the idea of foundational and cognitively accessible universal 
truths defended by modernism (Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993, 3). Jürgen Habermas 
has been one of the key representatives of modernism in the debate, attacking 
particularly the French postmodern current of thought from Bataille via 
Foucault to Derrida and criticizing them for rejecting the very commitments to 
truth, rationality and freedom that alone make philosophical critique possible 
(Peters, 1995, 23–24). Postmodernists, for their part, have often perceived 
modernism as a profoundly self-deceptive movement that merely conceals the 
provincial – that is, culturally imperialistic, Eurocentric and class-specific – 
roots of its claimed universalism (Bauman, 1993, 128–129; Cahoone, 1996, 12; 
Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993, 5–6). Moreover, one of the arguments presented by 
many postmodernists is that, instead of fulfilling their emancipatory promises, 
such modernist ideas as universally shared rationality and truth and the 
distinctions and classifications associated with them have become mere vehicles 
of discipline, power, marginalization and control (Bauman, 1993, 128–129; Bain, 
1995, 4). As Richard Bernstein (1983, 19; 1986, 344–345) points out, this radical 
juxtaposition between modernism and postmodernism is profoundly 
misleading, as it gains its force from a way of thinking that is itself being called 
into question: that is, “Cartesian anxiety” (ibid.) – the fear that if there are no 
basic constraints or foundations or ‘rules of the game’, we are confronted with 
an intellectual and moral chaos where anything goes. Bernstein (1986, 345) 
further argues that there is an almost desperate attempt to break out of and move 
beyond the dichotomies that characterize contemporary philosophical thinking. 
The three studies of this thesis participate in the discussion concerning the 
modernism-postmodernism debate from the viewpoint of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s (1900–2002) philosophy. Gadamer is one of the most important 
representatives of the tradition of modern hermeneutics and, at the same time, 
one of the central figures of twentieth-century continental philosophy. 
Gadamer’s philosophy, and particularly his main work Truth and Method 
(Wahrheit und Methode, 1960) in which he launched his prominent project of 
philosophical hermeneutics, represents a distinct and ground-breaking 
approach to the basic problems of hermeneutics. Gadamer’s project, deriving its 
primary influence from Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy on the one hand and 
Heideggerian thinking on the other, establishes a rigorous critique of both 
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Enlightenment rationalism and the intrusion of the methodology of the modern 
sciences into the humanities. Simultaneously, Gadamer develops cogent 
accounts of reason, truth and knowledge that refrain from relativism and 
subjectivism. The purpose of the three studies of this thesis is to illuminate the 
relation of Gadamer’s philosophy to both modernist and postmodernist 
philosophical approaches and particularly to examine the potential of Gadamer’s 
philosophy to contribute to the overcoming of the major philosophical problems 
and limitations associated with them. Accordingly, using Gadamer’s philosophy 
as their point of departure, the studies of this thesis aim to offer a more 
defensible warrant for educational theory and practice than that provided by the 
modernist philosophies of education on the one hand and the postmodernist 
educational standpoints on the other. 
In order to clarify what lies at the core of the modernism-postmodernism 
debate that gives the studies of this thesis their general framework, I will briefly 
illustrate what is typically meant by the concepts of ‘modernism’ and 
‘postmodernism’ and what these concepts refer to particularly in the context of 
this thesis. Firstly, it must be noted that neither of these concepts have univocal 
or established meanings, but these meanings have been subject to continuous 
discussion and debate. Both modernism and postmodernism are catch-all 
concepts or general umbrella terms for a variety of related meanings and both of 
these terms also belong to a family of interlinked concepts such as ‘modern’, 
‘modernity’, ‘postmodern’ and ‘postmodernity’. In this context, my attempt is 
not to provide exhaustive definitions for all of these concepts, but rather to focus 
on definitions that are important for understanding the studies of this thesis and 
the philosophical discussion in which they participate. Therefore, the following 
descriptions should be understood as providing only one possible way of 
defining these terms. Furthermore, although both the concepts of ‘modernism’ 
and ‘postmodernism’ are also employed to designate certain movements within 
culture and art, I delimit my examination to the philosophical meaning of these 
concepts.  
In the field of philosophy, the concept of ‘modernity’ most often designates 
an era, an attitude and a way of thinking that began in the seventeenth century 
with Descartes, reached its full maturity with the Enlightenment and extended 
well into the twentieth century (e.g. Cahoone, 1996, 12). One of the most 
prominent definitions of the term has been given by Jürgen Habermas (1993) in 
his famous essay “Modernity – An Incomplete Project”. Following Max Weber, 
Habermas (1993, 103) uses the term “the project of modernity” to refer to the 
development originating in the Enlightenment, which consisted of the attempt 
to develop objective science, universal morality and autonomous art according 
to their inner logic. The accumulated knowledge in these fields was to be utilized 
to advance the rationalization of everyday social life. The expectation was that 
the developments in these domains would promote not only the control of 
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natural forces, but also the understanding of self and world, moral progress, the 
justice of institutions and ultimately the happiness of human beings (ibid.). This 
Habermasian definition captures well what are typically perceived as the basic 
aspirations of modernity. As Cahoone (1996, 12) points out, the positive self-
image that modern Western culture has often projected of itself is a civilization 
founded on scientific knowledge of the world and rational knowledge of value, 
which places the highest premium on individual human life and freedom. This 
culture believes that such freedom and rationality will lead to social progress 
through virtuous, self-controlled work, creating a better material, political and 
intellectual life for all (ibid.). 
However, in contrast to this broad and societal characterization of the 
concept of modernity, the meaning of the concept of modernism intended in the 
context of this thesis is better captured through a narrower, more strictly 
philosophical definition presented by Bernstein (1986, 343–344), Dummett 
(1978, 458) and Natoli and Hutcheon (1993, 3). According to these authors, the 
basic concern of modern philosophy persisting from Descartes to the present has 
been to turn philosophy into a rigorous science, to discover its real foundations, 
its proper object and its systematic methodology. The purpose of this endeavour 
is to overcome the situation where philosophy is merely a battleground among 
competing opinions and thus to turn it into a legitimate form of knowledge. This 
definition of modernism shares some features with the concept of “objectivism” 
described by Bernstein (1983, 8) by which he refers to the idea “that there is or 
must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can 
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, 
reality, goodness, or rightness”. For an objectivist, the purpose of philosophy is 
to discover what this framework is and to defend the claim to have discovered it 
with the strongest possible reasons (ibid.). In what follows, I will primarily use 
the concept of modernism in this narrow sense to designate a line of thinking 
closely related to foundationalism. However, it must be noted that for 
contemporary modernists or objectivists such positions as Cartesian absolutism 
are no longer viable options. As Bernstein (1983, 12) points out, “the dominant 
temper of our age is fallibilistic” and therefore contemporary modernists and 
objectivists accept that there are no nontrivial knowledge claims that are 
immune to criticism. 
The term ‘postmodernism’ is generally perceived as highly controversial. 
There are few philosophers who have explicitly identified their approach as 
‘postmodern’ – most prominently Jean-François Lyotard, Gianni Vattimo, John 
Caputo and, in some connections, also Richard Rorty – while other thinkers who 
are often regarded as postmodernists have rejected the label. Moreover, it has 
been a topic of constant controversy, whether postmodernism can be perceived 
as establishing a radical break from modernism or whether it should rather be 
seen as a continuation of modernism or even as a development within 
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modernism itself (e.g. Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993, 3–4). The idea of self-critique 
and self-reflexivity is anything but foreign to modernism – rather, the critique 
of modernism can be regarded as beginning in the very heart of modern 
philosophy, in Kantianism, as Kant’s philosophy was set out to demonstrate the 
profound limitations of our ability to know (e.g. Habermas, 1998a, 260). 
Moreover, the critique of the self-destructive and self-contradictory tendencies 
of modernism presented by many postmodernists can be viewed as a 
continuation of parallel critiques developed within modernism itself. Perhaps 
the most prominent of these critiques is Theodor Adorno’s and Max 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) and similar critiques have also 
been presented by Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and even 
Habermas, although Habermas (1993, 106) argues that the self-contradictory 
tendencies of modernization should not lead us to reject the project of 
modernity.  
What is evident, however, is that postmodernism does not constitute one 
unified discourse, a systematic theory or a comprehensive philosophy, but it 
should rather be understood as an umbrella term for a multiplicity of 
philosophical lines of thinking, which nevertheless share some common features 
with other philosophical approaches that can be referred to as postmodern (e.g. 
Usher & Edwards, 1994, 7–8). Although some of the ideas typically regarded as 
‘postmodern’ were established already by the poststructuralists – most 
prominently by Jacques Derrida – in the 1960s,  Jean-François Lyotard was one 
of the first philosophers to bring the highly charged term of ‘postmodernity’ into 
the philosophical discourse. As Lyotard states in The Postmodern Condition 
(1979/1984), postmodernity stands for the “incredulity toward metanarratives” 
(Lyotard, 1984, xxiv) by which he means the general distrust in such narratives 
that claim to justify certain practices and institutions by grounding them upon a 
set of transcendental, ahistorical or universal principles. Accordingly, Lyotard 
(1984, xxiii) uses the term modern “to designate any science that legitimates 
itself with reference to a metadiscourse […] making an explicit appeal to some 
grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, 
the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth”. 
Lyotard argues that instead of one all-encompassing metanarrative of science or 
reason, there are different language games that are power-ridden, 
heteronomous and untranslatable to each other (Peters, 1995, 32).  
Richard Rorty is one of the postmodernists discussed in the studies of this 
thesis, who has explicitly endorsed the Lyotardian version of postmodernism as 
a general distrust in metanarratives, while, however, remaining sceptical about 
the concept of ‘postmodernism’ itself (Rorty, 1991d, 1). In his Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (1979/1980) Rorty famously adopts a similar anti-
representational and postfoundational stance as the one advocated by Lyotard. 
From the viewpoint of this thesis, one of the central insights of the book – and 
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Rorty’s philosophy in a more general sense – is the idea that there is no 
privileged grid of concepts or categories against which the variety of human 
practices and beliefs can be judged in order to determine their rationality (Rorty, 
1980; see also Festenstein, 2001, 5). This idea bears a resemblance to Bernstein’s 
(1983, 8) definition of “relativism”, which refers to the conviction that there is 
no substantive overarching framework or a single metalanguage by which we can 
rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims or alternative 
paradigms. Hence, according to a relativist, it is an illusion to believe that there 
are standards of rationality that are genuinely universal and not subject to 
historical or temporal change (ibid.).1 This postfoundational orientation is the 
primary meaning of the concept of postmodernism employed in the context of 
this thesis. However, postmodernism should not be understood as the 
acceptance of an anarchistic ‘anything goes’ attitude. As Rorty (1982, 166) points 
out, no philosopher actually holds this view. Rather, postmodernism usually also 
involves some criteria of rationality, given that these criteria or standards of 
choosing between different beliefs and paradigms are far less algorithmic and 
more local than argued by modernists (ibid.). 
Another branch of postmodernism addressed in the studies of this thesis is 
the one that derives its inspiration from Martin Heidegger’s critique of Western 
metaphysics. By the tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger refers to the tradition 
of Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, which is characterized by an 
ontological and epistemological foundationalism that seeks to ground reality 
and knowledge upon an “all-founding entity” or an absolute, permanent 
reference point (Thomson, 2005, 18). The critique of this tradition was one of 
the major themes of Heidegger’s late philosophy. The most prominent followers 
of this late Heideggerian thinking and thus the representatives of the 
postmetaphysical current of postmodernism are Jacques Derrida, John Caputo 
and Gianni Vattimo. Derrida’s work is associated with the French 
‘poststructuralist’ orientations of the 1960s and 1970s, which focus on the 
development and critique of classical structuralism. However, Derrida’s 
philosophy also extends into the critique of the metaphysical and logocentric 
tendencies of the tradition of Western philosophy in general. This critique is 
primarily influenced by the late Heideggerian, Nietzschean and Freudian 
thinking (Peters & Burbules, 2004, 14). Gianni Vattimo advocates a line of 
postmodernism that he himself refers to as “weak thought” (Vattimo, 1984), 
1 It is noteworthy that Rorty (1991a, 23) rejects the idea of the relativization of such 
concepts as rationality and truth. Instead, he endorses the view that he refers to as 
“ethnocentrism” (ibid.), which trivializes rather than relativizes these concepts. 
However, the common feature between Bernstein’s definition of relativism and Rorty’s 
ethnocentrism is the lack of a metalanguage or a metanarrative that would enable an 
impartial evaluation of competing language games or paradigms. Accordingly, Rorty also 
renounces the idea of cognitively accessible universal standards of rationality. I will 
address Rorty’s ethnocentrism as a form of postmodernism in more depth in chapter 4.  
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which represents an attempt to relinquish the foundational certainties of 
modernity. Vattimo is also particularly well-known for his developments in the 
field of postmetaphysical theology. The most relevant thinker in this context, 
however, is John Caputo, whose philosophy is addressed in one of the studies of 
this thesis. Caputo’s main concern in his project of radical hermeneutics (1987) 
is the redefinition of the concepts of rationality and ethics from a 
postmetaphysical perspective. For Caputo (1987), this means giving up the 
universal, fixed determinations associated with these notions and thus 
understanding both rationality and ethics in terms of radical indeterminacy and 
openness.   
Gadamer’s philosophy is particularly interesting in the light of the 
modernism-postmodernism debate, as it does not straightforwardly fall into 
either of these categories introduced above. Instead, it is characteristic of 
Gadamer’s philosophical position that it has been criticized by both the 
Enlightenment-oriented modernists – most prominently by Jürgen Habermas 
and Karl-Otto Apel – and postmodern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and 
John Caputo (e.g. Schmidt, 1995a, 8–9). Whereas modernists have accused 
Gadamer of failing to provide a sufficiently objective foundation for 
understanding and knowledge, postmodernists have criticized him for 
endorsing the continuity of meaning, security and familiarity over radical 
difference and disruption (ibid.). However, in some of the most prominent and 
influential interpretations of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, including those of 
Richard Bernstein (1983) and Georgia Warnke (1987), the fact that Gadamer’s 
philosophical position cannot be unproblematically classified as either ‘modern’ 
or ‘postmodern’ is perceived as a strength rather than a limitation. Namely, these 
authors suggest that by establishing a middle ground between modernism and 
postmodernism, Gadamer’s hermeneutics represents an important contribution 
to the movement beyond such binary dichotomies as modernism-
postmodernism and objectivism-relativism. 
The aim of the studies of this thesis is to continue the line of work established 
by such authors as Bernstein and Warnke by examining Gadamer’s relationship 
to modernism and postmodernism and thus illustrating the significance of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics for overcoming the radical opposition between them. 
The thesis consists of three interrelated studies that are constructed as dialogues 
between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and such philosophical approaches that can 
be characterized as either ‘modernist’ or ‘postmodernist’ and which therefore 
allow for illuminating Gadamer’s relationship to these positions. The 
philosophies addressed are Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory, John Caputo’s 
radical hermeneutics and Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. All of these three 
philosophers have, at some point, either engaged in actual dialogues with 
Gadamer or discussed his philosophy with the intention of situating Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics in relation to their own philosophical positions. In 
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this sense, these philosophies provide a particularly fruitful point of departure 
for elucidating the nature of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and its 
relation to modernism and postmodernism. 
The novel contribution of the studies of this thesis is to illuminate the 
relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the modernism-postmodernism debate 
specifically in the field of the philosophy of education. As I will demonstrate in 
section 1.1, a similar debate between modernism and postmodernism that has 
been ongoing in the field of philosophy has also been witnessed in the philosophy 
of education. As Nicholas C. Burbules (2000, 311–312) and Stefan Raemaekers 
(2002, 631) point out, this debate has resulted in a problematic juxtaposition 
between modernist and postmodernist educational standpoints that is likely to 
prevent any fruitful discussion and bridge-building between them. David Carr 
(1998, 3) makes a similar point as he argues that the rise of postmodern 
educational approaches has resulted in a drastic pluralisation of the discussion 
within the philosophy of education, which threatens to divide the field into 
radically different camps. Consequently, the debate has yielded a widespread 
scepticism concerning the possibility of a genuine communication or agreement 
in judgements and values between the rival approaches (ibid.).  
The argument unfolding in the three studies is that Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics is capable of avoiding some of the central philosophical problems 
and limitations associated with the modernist and postmodernist approaches 
addressed in the studies and therefore it contributes to the movement beyond 
the unproductive modernism-postmodernism dichotomy in the philosophy of 
education. In particular, I suggest that Gadamer succeeds in redefining the 
concepts of rationality and truth in a manner that eschews the foundationalist 
epistemology of the tradition of the Enlightenment without, however, trivializing 
or relativizing these notions. Accordingly, through these concepts, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics can provide education with orienting ideals and principles for the 
philosophical critique of educational practices without jeopardizing the 
hermeneutical awareness of the historicity and conditionedness of 
understanding. As I will later demonstrate, Gadamer’s hermeneutics thus offers 
a more defensible warrant for educational theory and practice than that 
provided by the modernist philosophies of education on the one hand and the 
postmodernist educational approaches on the other.  
This introductory part of the thesis is structured as follows: the first 
subsection (1.1) of this chapter focuses on illuminating the modernism-
postmodernism debate in the field of the philosophy of education and the second 
(1.2) provides an overview of the central philosophical interpretations on 
Gadamer’s relationship to modernism and postmodernism. Chapter 2 presents 
the aims and methodology of the studies and illustrates the choices concerning 
the primary literature utilized in them. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as the general theoretical framework of 
8 
the studies. Chapter 4 presents a reinterpretation of the findings of the studies 
in the light of the modernism-postmodernism debate, thus placing the 
individual studies within the broader framework of this thesis. Chapter 5 draws 
together the central findings of the studies and provides responses to the 
comprehensive research aims and questions of the thesis. The chapter also 
discusses some of the limitations and restrictions of the studies and indicates 
possibilities for future research. Chapter 6 is dedicated to final, concluding 
remarks.  
1.1 Modernism and postmodernism in the philosophy of 
education 
Educational theory can generally be regarded as a project of modernity and as 
deeply associated with the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment (e.g. Carr, 
2006, 144; Usher & Edwards, 1994, 24). Wilfred Carr (2006, 144) argues in his 
article “Education without Theory” that the educational theory project of the 
twentieth century has been, above all, a foundationalist project inspired by 
Enlightenment values and ideals and rooted in the epistemological assumptions 
of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century modernity. Notably, 
foundationalism has a much broader meaning for Carr than it has within 
mainstream epistemology, where the concept has a narrow, technical meaning, 
denoting one possible response to the ‘regress problem’ concerning epistemic 
justification (Siegel, 1998, 29). Carr (2006, 143) argues that in Kantian 
philosophy foundationalism was established as an aspiration to formulate 
universal standards of rationality that are undeniable to all rational persons and 
therefore independent of particular historical, social and cultural circumstances 
(ibid.). He further suggests that it was this Enlightenment aspiration that 
informed the modern social, political and educational theorists of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century about the way they were to define their 
intellectual ambitions and conduct their academic debates. Hence, according to 
Carr (ibid.), twentieth-century educational theory was predicated on the 
assumption that educational institutions and practices should be governed by 
theoretical knowledge that rests on rational foundations that are invariable 
across contexts and cultures and thus provide an external reference point from 
which the rationality of educational practices can be impartially evaluated.  
The most prominent example of the aforementioned foundationalism in 
educational theory is the analytic philosophy of education established by the 
famous ‘London School’ represented by R.S. Peters, Paul Hirst and Robert 
Dearden. As David Carr (1998, 4; see also Martin, 2012, 66) argues, in the works 
of the aforementioned educational theorists, foundationalism took the form of 
an attempt to identify the epistemological foundations for educational theory 
that would enable educational practice to be grounded on transculturally valid 
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rational principles. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this line of thinking is 
Hirst’s “Forms of Knowledge” thesis, according to which education is a matter 
of intellectual initiation of learners into a range of conceptually discrete forms of 
rational knowledge, which can be regarded as logically foundational to any 
balanced curriculum (Carr, 1998, 4). Peters’s project – and especially his famous 
transcendental arguments, which aimed to justify the practice of education and 
also to provide a justification for moral principles – can be regarded as an 
attempt to absolve procedures of justification and deliberation from any charge 
of arbitrariness (Martin, 2012, 66; Parker, 1997, 55). Therefore, Peters’s project 
is an analogous attempt to Hirst’s in providing a rational foundation for 
educational theory and practice in order to elevate this practice above its initial, 
unreflected status. David Carr (1998, 5) suggests that the underlying aim of both 
Hirst’s and Peters’s projects was the production of rational, unbiased and 
tolerant citizens of liberal-democratic polity, who are in principle able to operate 
at critical distance from the beliefs and ideas inherited from historical traditions. 
In this sense, Hirst’s and Peters’s philosophies were profoundly oriented by the 
critical ideals of the Enlightenment.  
The foundationalism represented by Hirst, Peters and Dearden among 
others, however, has been rigorously challenged by different branches of 
postmodernism since the 1980s and 1990s. In the philosophy of education, the 
term ‘postmodernism’ is equally ambiguous as in philosophy in general. Usher 
and Edwards (1994, 9), for instance, suggest that the entire attempt to capture 
the meaning of the term ‘postmodernism’ into a fixed definition is against the 
message of postmodernism, this message being that knowledge cannot be 
systematized or totalized into a singular, all-encompassing framework. David 
Carr (1998, 8–12) uses the umbrella term of postmodernism to refer to 
philosophical approaches committed to anti-realism about knowledge and truth 
as diverse as poststructuralism, Rortyan neopragmatism and the sociology 
of knowledge. Because of this ambiguity of the concept – and particularly 
because the notion of ‘postmodernism’ is often associated with undesirable 
forms of relativism – many philosophers of education prefer the narrower 
concept of ‘postfoundationalism’. Wilfred Carr (2006, 145) explains 
that postfoundationalism refers to a mode of philosophical discourse that 
acknowledges that there have been irreversible changes in the ways we now 
relate to the ideas established by modernism. This discourse also recognizes that 
these changes are so profound that the forms of theorizing that continue to rely 
on foundationalist assumptions are no longer acceptable in our attempts to 
understand the contemporary world. Carr (2006, 146) further argues that the 
collectively shared insight among the different branches of postfoundational 
thought is that obtaining a standpoint outside language, history and culture is a 
myth, as we are always interpretatively situated in and constrained by the 
particular discourses that we have acquired through socialization and 
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acculturation. In other words, postfoundationalism denies the possibility of a 
privileged epistemological position that allows one to transcend the 
particularities of one’s linguistic-historical standpoint. What follows from this is 
that, instead of being impartial and disinterested, knowledge is inevitably 
motivated by the interests and concerns of a particular historically, socially and 
linguistically contingent discourse and therefore preconditioned by the specific 
norms, beliefs and values embedded in it (Carr, 2006, 146–147; Van Goor, 
Heyting & Vreeke, 2004, 179).  
Especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a torrent of works by the 
leading philosophers of education – including Blake et al. (1998), Parker (1994), 
Peters (1995), Peters and Burbules (2004) and Usher and Edwards (1994) – 
strongly inspired by the central ideas of postmodern and postfoundational 
philosophy. All of these works are committed to questioning the ideas that have 
been regarded as particularly important in the modernist philosophy of 
education. Among the most important issues for these authors is the challenging 
of the modernist endeavour to discover fixed foundations of knowledge. As Blake 
et al. (1998, 29–30) suggest, the aim of postmodern or postfoundational 
philosophy is to demonstrate that the foundational endeavour fails because we 
have no access to reality or “genuine foundations” unmediated by language and 
dialogue. Language, they explain, is always profoundly intertwined with social 
relations and, ultimately, politics of knowledge (ibid.). Hence, as Usher and 
Edwards (1994, 26) further point out, postmodernism teaches philosophers of 
education to be sceptical of foundationalism in all forms, including the taken-
for-granted paradigms in education, whether these be liberal, conservative or 
progressive. According to these authors, all of these paradigms share some of the 
central metaphysical, epistemological and humanistic assumptions of 
modernism and, consequently, hide their partiality in foundations and absolutes 
in order to conceal their implications with the operation of power (ibid.). As a 
consequence of the recognition of the inevitably non-foundational nature of 
knowledge, the whole idea of educational philosophy and theory becomes 
problematized in the aforementioned works. The authors argue that the 
educational theorist can no longer claim the position from which the world of 
practice could be dictated or prescribed, as educational theory is itself a 
historically formed practice inseparable from the local contexts within which it 
is embedded (e.g. Blake et al., 1998, 178–179). However, the authors of these 
works are insistent that their abolishing of foundations does not raise the spectre 
of relativism, as the recognition of foundations as discursive constructions does 
not entail that ‘anything goes’. To challenge foundations is not to provoke 
irrationalism or paralysis but rather to foreground dialogue and practical 
engagement – norms are not found but made through struggles in which 
everyone must assume personal responsibility (Usher & Edwards, 1994, 27; see 
also Blake et al., 1998, 29). 
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Generally, the postmodern position described above has been regarded as 
informative in revealing cultural and subjective biases underlying different 
conceptions of rationality, objectivity and knowledge, as well as in illuminating 
the contemporary misbelief in those great narratives that have been 
characteristic of modernism. However, the postmodern critique of modernism 
has also generated forceful counter-arguments among those philosophers of 
education in favour of a more ‘modernist’ position. Many authors have feared 
that abandoning the modern epistemological concepts of truth, knowledge, 
objectivity and reason leads to intolerable relativism (e.g. Carr, 1998). In this 
context, relativism is often associated with the lack of a foundation or a rational 
basis for justifying beliefs (Carr, 1998, 11; Heyting, 2004, 496). This kind of 
relativism is not only perceived as self-refuting (Siegel, 1998, 30), but it is also 
suspected to result in the inability to distinguish between practices that have 
educational worth from those that serve mere convenience and utility or are 
based on either subjective or cultural inclinations (Carr, 1998, 13). It is also 
argued that education is by definition associated with certain ideals and aims 
which cannot be deciphered without an understanding of what is worthwhile 
and reasonable in some at least modestly objective or impartial sense (ibid.). 
Siegel (1998, 19) argues that it is difficult to see how we might understand 
educational activities such as teaching, the hoped-for educational outcomes such 
as learning or proposed educational aims and ideals without reference to the 
modern epistemological notions of rationality, truth, knowledge and 
justification, as they seem to be basic to any adequate philosophical perspective 
on education.  
Another argument often presented against postmodernism is that rejecting 
the foundationalist models of justification jeopardizes the possibility of 
philosophy to exert any critique of social and educational practices (Heyting, 
2004; Van Goor, Heyting & Vreeke, 2004). Namely, if the validity of our claims 
should in the end be traced to the convictions of a community of language-users 
instead of a ‘foundation’, philosophy will no longer be able to demonstrate even 
the wrongness of Nazi-like positions, as Heyting (2004, 496) points out. 
Papastephanou (2001, 297) introduces a similar critique of postmodernism as 
she argues that “educational philosophy aspiring to be something more than 
spectatorial, without some solid account of epistemology and normativity, is 
self-defeating. It will only reinforce what is socially current without being able 
to articulate the demand for change, let alone practice it, with all the evident 
repercussions for practical educational matters”. 
As it is unfortunately often the case with philosophical debates, the encounter 
between modernism and postmodernism in the philosophy of education has also 
resulted in a somewhat fruitless juxtaposition where the modern foundationalist 
account is polarized with the postmodern relativist anti-account or, depending 
on the perspective, the modernist monolithic view of reason is placed against the 
12 
postfoundational recognition of plurality, contextuality and difference 
(Burbules, 2000, 311–312; Raemaekers, 2002, 631). As I have indicated earlier, 
the dichotomy between modernism and postmodernism is misleading and it is 
also prone to prevent any fruitful dialogue between the different approaches as 
it exaggerates and highlights the differences between these views rather than 
illuminates their possible similarities and proximities. Moreover, the aggravated 
opposition between the two positions also conceals the fact that although the 
search for foundations continues to be a relevant task for some ‘modernist’ 
philosophers of education, they nevertheless recognize the profoundly fallible 
and correctible nature of knowledge (e.g. Siegel, 1998, 28). And the same goes 
for postmodernism: as the authors of Thinking Again emphasize, the 
postfoundational position that they advocate renounces both the subjectivist 
form of relativism – that is, the idea of a solipsistic subjectivity – as well as the 
linguistic relativism that portrays different language games as radically 
incommensurable (Blake et al., 1998, 12–15). Therefore, the viable option, as 
Bernstein (1983, 12) points out, is between a sophisticated form of fallibilistic 
objectivism and a nonsubjective, discursive conception of relativism, which are 
far closer to each other than the current debate in the philosophy of education 
indicates. This is not to say that the debate is ‘a lot of fuzz over nothing’. Rather, 
it must be acknowledged that genuine differences nevertheless exist between 
these rival paradigms and that these differences have also given rise to very 
different conceptions of education. As I pointed out earlier along the lines of 
David Carr (1998, 3), the confrontation between modernism and 
postmodernism in the philosophy of education has yielded a widespread 
scepticism that genuine communication or agreement in judgments and values 
might ever be a realistic outcome or a meaningful goal of this dialogue. Bridging 
the gap between modernism and postmodernism thus remains a continuing task 
for the philosophers of education. 
1.2 Previous interpretations of Gadamer’s relation to 
modernism and postmodernism 
Although there are few studies that explicitly focus on examining the relation of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the philosophical approaches of modernism and 
postmodernism (e.g. Bernstein, 1983, 1986), there is a great deal of literature 
that indirectly addresses this topic through the inquiry of Gadamer’s 
relationship to the prominent representatives of either modernism or 
postmodernism. Gadamer’s relationship to modernism has often been examined 
on the basis of his debates with some of the most distinguished contemporary 
modernists, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. Since the debate between 
hermeneutics and the critique of ideology that took place in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, it has become conventional to perceive Gadamer’s hermeneutics as 
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a conservative or a relativistic antithesis to the modernist tendencies 
represented by Habermas and Apel (e.g. How, 1995; Nicholson, 1991; Teigas, 
1995). Many interpretations of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, however, indicate that 
this conventional verdict is not fully justified (e.g. Bernstein, 1983; Hekman, 
1986; Scheibler, 2000; Warnke, 1987). These interpretations specifically pay 
attention to Gadamer’s notion of dialogue and the rational potential involved in 
the dialogical structure of understanding. Hermeneutical dialogue is perceived 
in these readings as a historically and linguistically embedded mode of 
justification through which prejudices governing understanding can be critically 
examined (Bernstein, 1983; Scheibler, 2000; Warnke, 1987). In many 
interpretations, similar possibilities of philosophical critique are associated with 
Gadamer’s concept of truth (Bernstein, 1986; Schmidt, 1995b; Healy, 2007). 
Bernstein (1986, 351) even goes so far as arguing that when Gadamer appeals to 
the concept of truth, he is implicitly appealing to what can be “argumentatively 
validated by a community of interpreters”. Bernstein (ibid.) therefore suggests 
that the hermeneutical notion of truth brings Gadamer into the immediate 
proximity of Habermas’s philosophy. In some interpretations, it is also argued 
that whereas Gadamer succeeds in maintaining the postfoundational orientation 
that both Habermas and Gadamer pursue, Habermas is ultimately unable to cut 
his ties with foundationalism (Bernstein, 1983; Healy, 2007; Hekman, 1986).  
Because of Gadamer’s emphasis on the historicity, linguisticality and context-
dependence of understanding, his philosophy has sometimes been associated 
with the ideas characteristic of postmodernism. One of the most famous of such 
interpretations is the one presented by Richard Rorty in his Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (1979/1980) where he turns to Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a 
model for the kind of “edifying” (Rorty, 1980, 360) philosophy that he himself 
endorses. This interpretation, however, has been challenged by appealing to 
Gadamer’s continuous concern for the concepts of knowledge and truth. Warnke 
(1987, 164–165), for instance, provides an illuminating comparison between 
Gadamer’s and Rorty’s philosophies and argues that whereas Rorty replaces the 
concern for truth and knowledge with interestingly diversified discussion, 
Gadamer holds that it is crucial that we pursue such knowledge that is concerned 
with living well and developing our praxis. This knowledge, however, is not 
necessarily achieved by the means of modern scientific method. Similar remarks 
have also been made by Bernstein (1983, 1986) and Scheibler (2000).  
Gadamer’s relationship to postmodernism has also been examined through 
the postmodern critiques directed towards his philosophy. The most well-known 
of these critiques is perhaps the one presented by Jacques Derrida in the context 
of the famous Gadamer-Derrida encounter in 1981. The primary issues of this 
critique were the presumably metaphysical origins of Gadamer’s concept of 
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the “good will” 2  (1989, 55), the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
hermeneutics and, finally, the question whether understanding ever amounts to 
consensus and continuance of meaning in the way suggested by Gadamer 
(Derrida, 1989, 52–54; see also Madison, 1989; Marshall, 1989; Michelfelder & 
Palmer, 1989; Schmidt, 1995a). As a response to Derrida’s critique, many 
commentators of the debate argue that Derrida misunderstands the meaning of 
the concept of the “good will” in Gadamer’s hermeneutics and that he also 
downplays the important roles that otherness and discontinuity play in 
Gadamer’s philosophy (ibid.). Moreover, the typical verdict of the Gadamer-
Derrida encounter is that no genuine dialogue ever took place between the two 
thinkers due to Derrida’s reluctance to participate in such conversation (Forget, 
1989; Madison, 1989; Marshall, 1989; Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989).  
Derrida’s critique of Gadamer has also inspired another postmodern review 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutics – that is, the one by John Caputo. Caputo accuses 
Gadamer of endorsing Platonic and Hegelian metaphysics and of appropriating 
the metaphysical distinction between a stable, objective meaning and its 
continuously changing expression (Caputo, 1987, 111; 1989, 262; 2000, 46). 
Caputo further suggests that despite Gadamer’s emphasis on the historicity of 
understanding, he fails to make use of the radical, postmetaphysical side of 
Heideggerian thinking and thus remains attached to the tradition of metaphysics 
(ibid.). This interpretation has been challenged by many commentaries: for 
instance, Ambrosio (1995, 100–102) argues that Caputo misunderstands the 
dialogical character of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Gadamer’s relation to late 
Heideggerian thinking as well as the meaning of the concept of application in 
Gadamer’s philosophy. Ambrosio (ibid.) further suggests that if there is a sense 
in which Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be said to concern itself with the 
transmission of unchanging truths, this must refer to the questions that are most 
fundamental and universal to human beings. Fairfield (2011, 204) makes a 
similar remark as he points out that Gadamer has clearly rejected all forms of 
objectivism and essentialism and constantly argued that understanding means 
‘understanding differently’. Because of this, Gadamer holds that there can be no 
single correct, conclusive interpretation as such but rather an inexhaustible 
multiplicity of meanings. Accordingly, the claim that associates Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics with metaphysical essentialism is simply false (ibid.).  
A third postmodern critique directed towards Gadamer’s philosophy is the 
one presented by Gianni Vattimo. According to Vattimo (1988, 141), Gadamer’s 
2 For Gadamer, the notion of the “good will” has nothing to do with the metaphysical 
concept of the ‘will’. Rather, as Gadamer (1989, 55) himself explains, the concept refers 
to the idea that “one does not go about identifying the weaknesses of what another person 
says in order to prove that one is always right, but one seeks instead as far as possible to 
strengthen the other’s viewpoint so that what the other person has to say becomes 
illuminating”. Gadamer (ibid.) argues that this kind of attitude is essential for 
understanding. 
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hermeneutics “sees no need to take too great a distance from Western 
metaphysics, but positions itself in a relation of fundamental continuity with it”. 
Therefore, according to Vattimo, Gadamer’s philosophy fails to provide a 
consistent critique of this tradition and particularly of the features that manifest 
themselves in existing social conditions through the dominance of calculative 
rationality (Vattimo, 1988, 131; Scheibler, 2000, 73). Gadamer is thus forced 
into the unquestioned acceptance of the existing social conditions as he is unable 
to exercise a similar productive critique of these conditions that, according to 
Vattimo, can be associated with Heidegger’s philosophy (Vattimo, 1988, 142; 
Scheibler, 2000, 80–81; Murphy, 2010, 140–141). Against this line of critique, 
Scheibler (2000, 81) argues that Gadamer not only appropriates but also 
develops Heidegger’s philosophy through incorporating into it the awareness of 
the social, intersubjective and dialogical conditions of language use. Scheibler 
(ibid.) further argues that the concept of language that Gadamer develops on the 
basis of Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally critical towards modern 
subjectivism and calculative rationality and thus does not place itself in a 
relation of continuity with them. 
As we can see from these contrasting critiques and interpretations of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, there is no univocal understanding of Gadamer’s 
relationship to either modernism or postmodernism. Rather, as Schmidt (1995a, 
8–9) points out, since the publication of Truth and Method, modernists have 
accused Gadamer of opening the door to relativism and of underrating the 
critical power of reflection, while the postmodernists have blamed Gadamer for 
remaining captive to the metaphysical assumptions of the tradition of modern 
philosophy. As Schmidt (ibid.) further suggests, these contradictory critiques 
that charge Gadamer for being either too relativistic or, alternatively, not 
relativistic enough perhaps indicate that Gadamer has in fact laid open a fruitful 
middle ground between his critics.  
This conclusion has been drawn also by many other commentators on 
Gadamer, perhaps most prominently by Richard Bernstein in his book Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism (1983). In this book, Bernstein (1983, 19) presents 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics as one of the most promising attempts in 
contemporary philosophy to overcome the problematic opposition between 
objectivism and relativism. 3  Bernstein (1983, 146) particularly focuses on 
Gadamer’s notion of phronesis, which represents the kind of reasoning that 
involves a distinctive mediation between the universal and the particular. 
Bernstein associates the specific value of this notion with the idea that there is a 
form of rationality that is not concerned with objective, theoretical knowledge 
3 As I explained in the introduction, the way Bernstein (1983, 8) utilizes the concepts of 
objectivism and relativism is parallel at least to the definitions of modernism and 
postmodernism that associate these concepts with the question of foundations of 
knowledge. 
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but rather with the practical knowledge and truth that shapes the human praxis 
and which cannot be captured independently of concrete historical situations. 
Another aspect of Gadamer’s thinking emphasized by Bernstein (1983, 153) is 
Gadamer’s notion of dialogue that, according to him, represents a mode of 
justification characteristic of our historical and linguistic existence. 
Bernstein has also provided illuminating comparisons between Habermas, 
Gadamer and Rorty (Bernstein, 1986) and Habermas, Gadamer and Derrida 
(Bernstein, 2002). In both cases Bernstein draws the conclusion that although 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be interpreted as having more affinities with 
Habermasian modernism than with either of the postmodernist philosophies 
mentioned above, the differences between all of the aforementioned approaches 
are rather differences in degree than absolute oppositions (Bernstein, 1986, 346; 
2002, 281). A similar comparison has also been made by Georgia Warnke. She 
(1987, 168) examines Gadamer’s relationship to Habermas’s, Apel’s and Rorty’s 
philosophies and draws the conclusion that Gadamer seeks to preserve the 
Enlightenment ideals of freedom and reason while rendering them compatible 
with the cultural and linguistic embeddedness of understanding. In this sense, 
Warnke also suggests that Gadamer’s philosophy represents a fruitful middle 
ground between Habermas’s and Apel’s modernism and Rorty’s 
postmodernism. It is particularly this line of work exemplified by Bernstein and 
Warnke among others – that is, the line that seeks to illuminate the significance 
of Gadamer’s philosophy for overcoming the dichotomy between modernism 
and postmodernism – that I wish to continue in this thesis.  
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2 RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS 
In this chapter, I elucidate the common aims of the three studies of this thesis 
(referred to in the text by Roman numerals I–III) and I also express these aims 
in the form of research questions to which the studies aim to respond from their 
respective angles. Moreover, I explicate the methodology of the studies and give 
a detailed description of their research processes. Finally, I illustrate the choices 
concerning the primary source literature utilized in this thesis.  
2.1 Research aims and questions 
The common aim of the studies of this thesis is to examine the possibility of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to contribute to the overcoming of the unproductive 
modernism-postmodernism dichotomy in the field of the philosophy of 
education. More specifically, the studies aim to clarify the potential of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics to offer a more defensible warrant for educational theory and 
practice than that provided by the modernist philosophies of education on the 
one hand and the postmodernist educational standpoints on the other. The 
studies seek to accomplish this aim by studying the relationship of Gadamer’s 
philosophy to some of the prominent representatives of modernism and 
postmodernism and by establishing that Gadamer’s hermeneutics circumvents 
some of the major philosophical problems and limitations associated with these 
approaches. The studies particularly focus on the concepts of rationality and 
truth that play a central role in the foundationalist epistemology of modernism 
and that have been somewhat trivialized or relativized by many postmodernist 
standpoints. Through Gadamer’s redefinitions of these concepts, the studies 
seek to establish a postfoundational and yet nonrelativistic justification for 
educational theory and practice and thus to surpass some of the major 
difficulties associated with modernist and postmodernist philosophies of 
education.  
As I explained in the introduction, in the context of this thesis, I use the 
concept of modernism in a narrow sense to refer to a line of thinking that is 
closely associated with foundationalism and the Bernsteinian concept of 
“objectivism” (Bernstein, 1983, 8). In this sense, the concept of modernism 
refers to the basic conviction that the task of philosophy is to search for an 
impartial, objective or universal foundation upon which such notions as 
rationality and truth can be founded and which allows distinguishing justified 
beliefs and norms from unjustified ones. In the studies, ‘modernism’ is 
represented by Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory, which is a widely recognized 
and utilized philosophical approach not only in contemporary philosophy  
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but also in the philosophy of education. 4  Accordingly, with the concept of 
postmodernism, I refer to such philosophical approaches that profoundly 
challenge the possibility of the existence of epistemological and ethical 
foundations. The postmodern approaches suggest that there is no foundation or 
an over-arching metalanguage upon which the superiority of one paradigm or 
language game over others could be conclusively determined. Consequently, 
many postmodernists argue that different language games should be understood 
as radically incommensurable and non-translatable to one another. As indicated 
in the introduction, this is the line of thinking that Bernstein (1983, 8) refers to 
as “relativism”. In the studies, I primarily focus on Richard Rorty’s and John 
Caputo’s postmodernist philosophies that share some common features with the 
lines of thought held by many postmodern philosophers of education.  
The common aims of the studies can be expressed briefly in the form of the 
following research questions:  
1. How does Gadamer’s hermeneutics relate to Habermasian modernism
and the postmodernist philosophies of Caputo and Rorty?
2. What is the relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics (and particularly its
concepts of rationality and truth) to the philosophy of education?
3. How does Gadamer’s hermeneutics contribute to the overcoming of the
unproductive dichotomy between the modernist and postmodernist
philosophies of education?
All three studies of this thesis approach the first research question from different 
perspectives: study I focuses on Gadamer’s relation to Habermas’s modernist 
philosophy in the context of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. The study 
particularly defends Gadamer against the charges of conservatism and 
relativism presented by Habermas. Study II provides a comparison between 
Habermas’s, Gadamer’s and Caputo’s philosophies and thus illuminates 
Gadamer’s relationship to both Habermasian modernism and Caputo’s 
postmodern hermeneutics. Study III compares Gadamer’s and Rorty’s 
philosophies as approaches to the philosophy of science and thus demonstrates 
how Gadamer’s hermeneutics departs from Rorty’s postmodern critique of the 
natural sciences. 
The second research question is addressed in studies I and III: study I 
examines the relevance of Gadamer’s notions of tradition and phronesis to the 
4 Although Habermas refers to himself as a postfoundationalist, the argument that I 
present in study II is that Habermas’s philosophy involves foundationalist tendencies, 
which associate his philosophical project with the Bernsteinian concept of objectivism. I 
address this topic in more depth in section 4.1. 
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philosophy of education and illustrates how the educational aim of rationality 
can be conceived from the perspective of historical situatedness. Study III 
focuses on the relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to science education 
through illuminating the hermeneutical dimensions of learning, knowledge and 
scientific research. These studies also provide partial answers to the third 
research question as they demonstrate how such concepts as rationality, 
knowledge and truth can be sustained as the central concepts of the philosophy 
of education while taking into account the profound historicity and 
linguisticality of human existence. Moreover, in addition to the three original 
studies, the research questions are addressed in a comprehensive manner in 
chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 provides a reinterpretation of the findings of the 
original studies in the light of the modernism-postmodernism distinction and 
chapter 5 draws together the central findings of all three studies and discusses 
them in regard to the aims and research questions introduced above. 
2.2 Research method 
The studies of this thesis are based on philosophical research and analysis of the 
central philosophical literature utilized in the studies. As Claudia Ruitenberg 
(2009, 316) points out, philosophical research employs a much broader 
conception of method than its Baconian definition as “a technique that can be 
applied reliably irrespective of the talent of the researcher”. According to her, in 
philosophical research the concept of method refers to the various ways and 
modes in which philosophers think, read, write, speak and listen, make their 
work systematic, purposeful and responsive to past and present philosophical 
concerns and conversations (ibid.). This broad conception of ‘method’ also 
applies to the studies of this thesis. However, this definition does not yet provide 
much information of the actual stages, choices or procedures involved in the 
research processes of the studies. Therefore I have outlined the following 
description to illustrate the nature of these processes. The research ‘method’ of 
the studies can be associated with the implementation of the following steps: (1) 
proposing an initial hypothesis or a research problem; (2) studying the relevant 
literature concerning this hypothesis; (3) searching for lines of argumentation 
and interpretation for and against the initial hypothesis and comparing them in 
a critical manner; (4) revising or reasserting the initial hypothesis on the basis 
of the findings of the previous step and, finally, (5) constructing the argument of 
the study and supporting it with relevant references to the literature. Evidently, 
the research processes did not necessarily follow the exact sequence of the steps 
listed above but these steps are rather intended as examples of the kind of typical 
procedures and stages involved in these processes. In what follows, I will briefly 
explicate how these steps were carried out in the individual studies.  
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In study I, I began with two initial hypotheses: (1) despite Gadamer’s 
emphasis on historicity and tradition, the conventional view of Gadamer’s 
philosophy as inherently conservative is not fully justified; and (2) Gadamer’s 
idea of the interrelated nature of tradition and reason might have important 
implications for the philosophy of education. My general impression was that 
the Gadamer-Habermas debate had strongly influenced the way Gadamer’s 
philosophy is perceived in the mainstream philosophical discussion. Therefore I 
began the research concerning the first hypothesis with a thorough study of the 
four essays of the Gadamer-Habermas debate and the relevant commentary 
literature on the topic. I learned that there was a strong current of 
interpretations supporting Habermas’s argument and I also discovered that this 
current had gained a predominant role in the philosophical discussion. 
However, I also found another line of interpretation paying more attention to 
the dialogical and critical dimensions of Gadamer’s concept of understanding 
and thus supporting my own initial interpretation of Gadamer’s philosophy. 
After critical examination, I was still convinced that the latter line of 
interpretation found more support in Gadamer’s own texts. Therefore, utilizing 
this line of interpretation as my point of departure, I defended Gadamer against 
the charges of conservatism through illuminating the critical and reflective 
potential involved in hermeneutical understanding. I then moved on to my 
second initial hypothesis regarding the educational significance of Gadamer’s 
philosophy. I studied the relevant discussions on the concept of rationality 
within the philosophy of education and discovered that the concept is often 
associated with the ability to adopt a critical distance to one’s cultural and social 
heritage. In contrast to this, Gadamer’s claim is that reason and tradition are 
fundamentally intertwined. From this perspective, I realized that Gadamer’s 
notion of rationality might provide a needed corrective to the somewhat 
ahistorical understanding of reason prevailing in many educational 
interpretations of the concept. Based on these findings, I finally constructed my 
own argument concerning the significance of Gadamer’s concepts of tradition 
and phronesis for outlining an idea of situated rationality as a central 
educational aim. 
In study II, my initial hypothesis was that Gadamer’s philosophy does not 
unproblematically fall into either of the categories of objectivism or relativism 
and it might therefore contribute to the overcoming of the radical opposition 
between them. I had formed this hypothesis based on my reading of Richard 
Bernstein’s work among other authors. I chose to examine Gadamer’s relation 
to objectivism and relativism specifically through Habermas’s and Caputo’s 
philosophies because their critiques of Gadamer represented contrasting 
interpretations of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, one associating it with relativism 
and the other with metaphysical essentialism. I started my research with a 
thorough examination of these critiques and the commentary literature related 
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to them. I found that there were certain limitations to both Habermas’s and 
Caputo’s readings of Gadamer. Namely, there was a line of interpretation 
suggesting that Gadamer’s philosophy is much less relativistic than Habermas 
claims and almost a unanimous verdict that Caputo’s interpretation of the 
inherent essentialism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is misguided. These 
interpretations supported my initial understanding of Gadamer’s philosophy as 
a middle way between objectivism and radical relativism. I decided to go beyond 
a mere defensive response to Habermas’s and Caputo’s critiques and to 
reconstruct a Gadamerian concept of rationality on the basis of those 
interpretations of Gadamer that emphasize the dialogical and justificatory 
nature of hermeneutical understanding. This reconstruction also proved to be 
fruitful for indicating deficiencies in Habermas’s and Caputo’s own conceptions 
of rationality. The conclusive argument that I developed in the study was that 
the Gadamerian notion of rationality avoids the foundationalist tendencies 
encountered in Habermas’s philosophy as well as the radical relativism 
associated with Caputo’s postmodern concept of reason. 
In study III, I had two initial hypotheses: (1) although Gadamer’s philosophy 
shares some features with the postmodern critique of science, it does not result 
in a similar rejection of the concepts of knowledge and truth as encountered in 
many postmodern philosophies, including Rorty’s; and (2) Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics might offer an enriched understanding of the nature of science 
education by illuminating its hermeneutical features. I began the research 
concerning the first hypothesis by studying both Rorty’s and Gadamer’s texts 
that were relevant to the topic as well as the literature on the hermeneutic 
philosophy of science and science education. Despite some of the similarities in 
Gadamer’s and Rorty’s philosophies, I discovered that their attitudes toward 
such concepts as truth and knowledge were radically different. I also found that 
the authors advocating a hermeneutic philosophy of science sharply contrasted 
Gadamer’s philosophy with postmodern philosophies, sociology of knowledge 
and other approaches in which scientific research is reduced to a mere social or 
political phenomenon (e.g. Eger, 2006). These findings served as the ground for 
my argument concerning the compatibility of Gadamer’s hermeneutics with 
some of the ideas involved in natural scientific research, particularly the idea of 
fallibilism. I then reflected on my second hypothesis by examining the literature 
on hermeneutics and science education, Martin Eger’s (2006) work in 
particular. Following Eger’s argumentation and Gadamer’s (2008a) own claim 
concerning the universality of the hermeneutical experience, I constructed two 
arguments of which the first concerned the hermeneutical nature of science 
education and learning. The second argument was more prescriptive as it 
indicated that incorporating the awareness of the hermeneutical features of 
knowledge and research into science education might prevent the students from 
adopting a narrow, technical orientation towards the sciences.  
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2.3 Source literature 
The primary source utilized in the studies of this thesis is Gadamer’s main work 
Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode, 1960/2004), which is 
unquestionably Gadamer’s most important and thorough examination of the 
themes of his philosophical hermeneutics. In addition to Truth and Method, I 
also used several of Gadamer’s individual essays as the source material of the 
studies. In studies I and II, I primarily utilized the two essays that Gadamer 
wrote during the Gadamer-Habermas debate as responses to Habermas’s 
critique: “Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology: Metacritical 
Comments on Truth and Method” (1967/1986) and “Reply to My Critics” 
(1971/1990). These essays play a central role in the Gadamer-Habermas debate 
and they were therefore particularly important for understanding Gadamer’s 
relation to Habermas’s philosophy. In study III, in addition to Truth and 
Method, I utilized some of the essays of the translated essay collections Reason 
in the Age of Science (1981) and Philosophical Hermeneutics (2008) in which 
Gadamer addresses the themes of natural scientific research and the 
technological orientation of the modern sciences.5 In the context of study III, 
these essays were particularly useful for clarifying Gadamer’s conception of the 
natural sciences. In addition to the aforementioned works, in this introductory 
part of the thesis, I employ some of Gadamer’s later writings on ethics, practical 
philosophy and modern sciences included in the essay collections Reason in the 
Age of Science (1981), Praise of Theory: Speeches and Essays (1998) and 
Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics (1999).6  
Regarding Habermas’s philosophy, in study I my primary sources were the 
section on hermeneutics in On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1970/1988) and 
the essay “On Hermeneutics’ Claim to Universality” (1970/1986) in which 
Habermas establishes his critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. These essays 
form a central part of the Gadamer-Habermas debate and therefore they were 
particularly important for my examination in study I. In study II, in addition to 
the two aforementioned texts, I also strongly relied on Habermas’s The Theory 
of Communicative Action. Volume I. Reason and the Rationalization of Society 
(1981/1984) in which Habermas establishes his famous theory of 
communicative action and also introduces the concept of communicative 
5 The essays utilized were “On the Philosophic Element in the Sciences and the Scientific 
Character of Philosophy” (Gadamer, 1981a) and “The Universality of the Hermeneutical 
Problem” (Gadamer, 2008a) of which the second is also published as a part of the essay 
collection The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings (2007). 
6 These essays include “What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason” (Gadamer, 
1981b), “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy” (Gadamer, 1981c), “Hermeneutics as a 
Theoretical and Practical Task” (Gadamer, 1981d), “The Ideal of Practical Philosophy” 
(Gadamer, 1998a), “Science and the Public Sphere” (1998b), “Science as an Instrument 
of Enlightenment” (1998c) and “On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics” (1999). 
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rationality. The second volume of Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative 
Action, however, was not utilized in the studies, as it did not directly bear upon 
the issues addressed in them. In this introductory part of the thesis, I have also 
utilized some of Habermas’s other important works that address the topic of 
communicative rationality, including Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action (1983/1990), Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays 
(1988/1994), The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
(1985/1998) and Truth and Justification (1999/2003).  
In regard to Caputo’s philosophy, in study II I focused on Caputo’s two 
renowned works Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the 
Hermeneutic Project (1987) and More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing 
Who We Are (2000). The first of these books is the one in which Caputo launches 
his philosophical project known as radical hermeneutics and where he also 
establishes his critique of Gadamer’s philosophy, whereas in the second he 
continues his discussion on these themes. In study III, my primary sources on 
Rorty’s philosophy were Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979/1980) 
where Rorty utilizes Gadamer’s philosophy as a model for his idea of the 
“edifying” nature of philosophy; and the essay collection Objectivity, Relativism 
and Truth (1991) in which Rorty addresses the topic of natural sciences and also 
provides discussions on the concepts of truth, rationality, objectivity and 
relativism. 
Concerning secondary literature, I primarily employed works that approach 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics from an epistemological viewpoint or at least 
incorporate an epistemological perspective into their examination (e.g. 
Barthold, 2010; Bernstein, 1983, 1986; Warnke, 1987). This choice was made 
based on the general focus of this thesis on the modernism-postmodernism 
debate that mainly concerns epistemological questions and issues. Moreover, I 
also utilized works that were particularly important for illuminating the nature 
and role of the concept of dialogue in Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Gjesdal, 2008; 
Healy, 2007; Scheibler, 2000; Vilhauer, 2010). This concept is one of the central 
notions of Gadamer’s philosophy and it plays a pivotal role in all three studies of 
this thesis.  
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: GADAMER’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
In this chapter, I provide an introduction to Gadamer’s hermeneutics focusing 
particularly on the historical and dialogical nature of understanding and on 
some of the central Gadamerian concepts associated with these themes. The 
notions of historicity and dialogue are not only crucial for understanding 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in a general sense but they are particularly important 
for clarifying Gadamer’s views on the concepts of rationality, truth and 
knowledge that play a central role in the modernism-postmodernism debate.  
3.1 Introduction to the central themes of Gadamer’s philosophy 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) began his philosophical career as a scholar 
of ancient Greek philosophy. His studies with his long-term teacher and mentor 
Martin Heidegger in Freiburg in the 1920s profoundly influenced the course of 
Gadamer’s intellectual development and had a far-reaching impact on his later 
philosophy. During the Third Reich and World War II, Gadamer kept to his 
studies in ancient Greek philosophy and continued his career as a university 
teacher and professor.7 It was not until 1960 that Gadamer finally published his 
major work Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode) in which he established 
the foundations of his philosophical project that came to be known as 
philosophical hermeneutics. The importance of Gadamer’s Truth and Method 
was soon recognized internationally. As a result, Gadamer rose from an 
appreciated university professor and little-known scholar in ancient Greek 
philosophy to one of the leading representatives of modern hermeneutics and to 
the key figures of twentieth-century continental philosophy (Lawn, 2006).  
Although Truth and Method is a vast and multifaceted book that involves 
extensive parts on aesthetics and language, the idea of the historicity of 
understanding and the associated critique of modernism is by far the most 
influential contribution of Gadamer’s main work. Deriving his primary 
inspiration from Heidegger’s early works, especially Being and Time (Sein und 
Zeit, 1927/2010), Gadamer sets himself against the basic tendencies of 
7 After Freiburg, Gadamer followed Heidegger to the University of Marburg, where he 
worked first as an assistant from 1923 and then, from 1928, as a Privatdozent, until he 
was finally granted professorship in 1937. After Marburg, Gadamer held a professorship 
at the University of Leipzig for a decade (1938–1948) and was also later appointed rector 
of the university (1946). In the fall of 1947, Gadamer received a professorship in Frankfurt 
where he worked for two years until he was appointed as chair of the philosophy 
department at the University of Heidelberg, where he stayed until his retirement in 1968 
(Gadamer, 1997; Dostal, 2002). 
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modernism and the Enlightenment, challenging their over-reliance on the ideal 
of a rational method in the quest for certain and presuppositionless knowledge. 
Gadamer’s central argument is that the modern faith in a rationally authorized 
method and scientific progress has led us to neglect the mode of being that 
precedes all methodological, rational and scientific endeavours (Lawn, 2006, 34; 
see also Weinsheimer, 1985, 164). According to Gadamer, this mode of being is 
historicity, which refers to the idea that our being and understanding are 
ontologically connected to the historical circumstances in which we find 
ourselves (Gadamer, 2004, 268, 278). Gadamer (ibid.) thus argues that rather 
than having an ahistorical essence, our humanity as well as our rationality is 
preconditioned by the historical pre-understanding that we inherit from our 
tradition. This idea represents a radical break with Cartesian epistemology in 
which the aim was precisely to achieve knowledge purified from the contextual 
factors involved in the process of knowledge formation. Gadamer (2004, 277, 
282) argues that perceiving our belongingness to history as something that must 
be reflectively surpassed neglects the fact that reason is itself situated in 
tradition and therefore cannot make the totality of tradition an object of 
investigation. In Gadamer’s view, there is no critical space, no Archimedean 
point or a secure foundation existing outside the medium of tradition that 
constitutes our being.  
In addition to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, Gadamer’s critique also 
extends to the earlier tradition of modern hermeneutics.8 Gadamer argues that 
understanding should not be perceived as a specific method through which the 
original meaning of the historical text or some other expression of the past can 
be attained (Gadamer, 2004, 268). Rather, following in Heidegger’s footsteps, 
Gadamer suggests that understanding is our very mode of being-in-the-world 
(e.g. Warnke, 1987, 40–41). Moreover, Gadamer (2004, 300–301) also argues 
that because our understanding of texts is shaped by the interpretative tradition 
to which we belong and by the unique place that we occupy in this tradition, the 
meaning of a text cannot be grasped independently of our particular historical 
circumstances. Therefore, the interpretation that results from the process of 
understanding is not one that reflects the intentions of the text’s original author 
but it is rather an expression of the particular significance that the text has for 
the interpreter and his or her historical situation (Gadamer, 2004, 283, 298).  
Gadamer’s idea of the historicity of understanding thus also entails an 
important transformation of the concepts of knowledge and truth. Namely, one 
of Gadamer’s central arguments is that these notions are not exhausted by the 
8  Gadamer (2004) particularly criticizes the hermeneutic philosophies of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) as well as the historicism 
of Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884) for their 
methodological orientation that borrows its model from the ideal of objectivity involved 
in the natural sciences (e.g. Lawn & Keane, 2011, 38).   
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knowledge accessible through the modern scientific method (e.g. Bernstein, 
1983, 151). As Bernstein (ibid.) points out, one of the primary intentions of Truth 
and Method is to defend the legitimacy of speaking of the ‘truth’ of works of art, 
texts and tradition. Hence, against the idea of truth as correspondence between 
a thought and its object, Gadamer introduces the idea of truth as a “fusion of 
horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung, Gadamer, 2004, 305). This fusion is 
understood as the emergence of a new horizon of meanings that opens up new 
possibilities of understanding and is thus primarily valuable to the one who 
understands and to his or her particular historical situation. In what follows, I 
will examine these general ideas of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in 
greater detail, focusing on the themes of historicity and dialogicality of 
understanding. 
3.2 The historicity of understanding 
The idea of the historicity of understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is based 
on the view that understanding always takes place from within a historically and 
linguistically structured pre-understanding that functions as a condition of 
possibility of understanding. Gadamer refers to the individual preconceptions or 
prejudgments that constitute this pre-understanding as prejudices (Vorurteil, 
Gadamer, 2004, 273). For Gadamer, the significance of prejudices for 
understanding is twofold. On the one hand, prejudices are necessary and 
positive preconditions of understanding, in the sense that they allow different 
things to appear as something and therefore as meaningful. On the other hand, 
since prejudices present the objects of understanding as always already pre-
interpreted, they prevent understanding from grasping these objects impartially 
or ‘in themselves’. Prejudices can thus provide only a limited and partial 
perspective into the matters at hand (Hogan, 2010, 100–102; Warnke, 1987, 75–
76). 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer’s rehabilitation of the notion of prejudice is 
intended as a critique of the ideal of presuppositionless knowledge involved in 
the Enlightenment. According to Gadamer (2004, 273), it was not until the 
Enlightenment that the notion of prejudice gained the negative connotations 
associated with it today, as the notion was then misleadingly given the meaning 
of an unfounded judgment. As pointed out above, in Gadamer’s philosophy, 
prejudices are inevitable preconditions of understanding and thus do not have a 
positive or negative role per se. Rather, they are simply judgments that precede 
the examination of the elements of a situation (ibid.). Gadamer argues that the 
Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudices” (Gadamer, 2004, 274) has led to 
two false assumptions: firstly, that methodical reflection can result in complete 
freedom from prejudices and, secondly, that prejudices are always 
disadvantageous for understanding. Gadamer’s polemic claim is that there are 
28 
also prejudices that can be beneficial for understanding and therefore 
‘knowledge’ is not tantamount to freedom from presuppositions.  
Gadamer’s rehabilitation of the concepts of tradition and authority is closely 
related to the idea of the prejudiced nature of understanding. The primary 
intention of this rehabilitation is to correct the Enlightenment’s misguided view 
of tradition and authority as being diametrically opposed to rationality and 
reflection. Gadamer (2004, 279–281) argues that authority is essentially based 
on knowledge instead of coercion or dominion. He justifies this controversial 
claim by suggesting that a person relies on the authority of another when this 
person believes that the other knows something better and not because the 
person is coerced to do so (ibid.). Gadamer (2004, 281) then introduces the idea 
of the authority of tradition as a critique of the Enlightenment’s abstract 
separation between tradition and reason. Gadamer’s (2004, 282–283) claim is 
that this separation has led to the erroneous belief that rational reflection only 
dissolves traditional prejudices, whereas it can actually also result in the 
reappropriation of tradition. By this argument, Gadamer’s intention is not to 
suggest that we should preserve traditional beliefs and practices but, rather, to 
indicate that the Enlightenment’s abstract opposition between tradition and 
reason has mistakenly designated tradition as an irrational source of error and 
dogma. Gadamer’s rejection of conservatism becomes especially clear in his 
statement that Romanticism, which regards tradition as an absolute source of 
validity against which all reason must remain silent, is ultimately just as 
dogmatic and prejudiced as the Enlightenment. Namely, it merely reproduces 
the Enlightenment’s abstract opposition between tradition and reason 
(Gadamer, 2004, 282). Gadamer’s purpose is, above all, to highlight the idea 
that tradition is itself a condition of the possibility of understanding and 
rationality and therefore it cannot be perceived as contradictory to reason.  
This bears directly upon Gadamer’s idea of tradition as effective history 
(Wirkungsgeschichte, Gadamer, 2004, 299). The concept of effective history 
refers to the idea that, when we understand some work of art or a historical text 
from a temporal distance, its meaning can only be grasped as it is transmitted 
and effected by the tradition of interpretations that has gone before us. Gadamer 
argues that effective history influences our understanding to the extent that it 
determines what appears to us as being meaningful and worth inquiring into 
(Gadamer, 2004, 300). Effective history thus makes understanding inescapably 
partial and interested instead of being objective and disinterested. History is 
continuously influencing us in the present, even in the denial of its influence or 
in the attempt to prevent it from affecting our understanding (ibid.). It 
determines the background of our values, cognitions and even our critical 
judgments and we can therefore never give a full account of the ways in which 
history influences us, nor is it possible to become detached from this influence 
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completely. “Historically effected consciousness is more being than 
consciousness”, as Gadamer (2008b, 38) himself states.9 
However, despite Gadamer’s insistence on the power of effective history, he 
develops a distinctly reflective notion of “effective historical consciousness” 
(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein, Gadamer, 2004, 301). With this concept 
he refers to both the fact that our consciousness is always effected by history and 
to the mandate that one’s historical situatedness must be made explicit in order 
to examine the ways in which it operates in understanding the historical past. 
The concept of effective historical consciousness thus simultaneously signifies 
an awareness of the limits of hermeneutical understanding and the reflective 
examination of these limits. According to Gadamer (2004, 301–302), 
hermeneutical understanding can become genuinely influential only as a 
consequence of incorporating effective historical consciousness as a part of its 
inquiry.  
Gadamer’s idea of application (Anwendung, Gadamer, 2004, 306) follows 
directly from the notion of effective history. Since we cannot understand a 
historical text or some other embodiment of tradition independently of our 
situatedness in history, understanding the meaning of a text requires applying 
it to ourselves and to our particular historical situation. However, Gadamer 
(2004, 309–310) argues that application is not a conscious act performed after 
understanding the meaning of the text. That is, we do not first grasp the meaning 
of the text in some detached, objective or universal sense and then apply it to 
ourselves. Rather, when we understand, we have always already applied the 
text’s meaning to ourselves and to our particular historical situation. Rather than 
two distinct features, understanding and application are therefore inseparable 
elements of a unitary hermeneutical process (Gadamer, 2004, 309; see also 
Vilhauer, 2010, 56). 
Gadamer (2004, 310) draws the model for the concept of application from 
the tradition of theological and legal hermeneutics on the one hand and from the 
Aristotelian notion of phronesis (prudence or practical reason), on the other.10 
9 This citation is from the essay “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection” 
that was published as a part of the translated essay collection Philosophical 
Hermeneutics. In addition, the essay has also been published under the name “Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology: Metacritical Comments on Truth and 
Method” in the edited volume The Hermeneutics Reader. In this translation, the 
aforementioned sentence is translated as follows: “effective historical consciousness is 
inescapably more existence than it is consciousness” (Gadamer, 1986, 288).  
10  Gadamer (2004, 307–308) argues that in the early tradition of hermeneutics, 
application was still recognized as an integral element of all understanding. It was not 
until romantic hermeneutics that the dimension of application was misleadingly excluded 
from the hermeneutical process. Gadamer (2004, 309) points out that there are 
specifically two disciplines – legal and theological hermeneutics – which provide a 
genuine example for hermeneutical understanding, as in these disciplines application has 
always formed a central dimension of the process of understanding.  
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In Aristotelian ethics, the concept of phronesis is associated with the 
relationship between the universal and the particular. More specifically, it refers 
to the practical rationality that enables the application of a universal moral norm 
within a concrete situation that requires moral action.11 Gadamer reinterprets 
and modifies this Aristotelian notion in order to present a profoundly 
hermeneutical idea: namely, that we cannot understand meanings 
independently of the concreteness of our historical lives and of the particular 
situations in which we always already find ourselves (Barthold, 2010, 60). 
Understanding is therefore not merely reproductive but it always involves a 
productive element as well, as it constantly adds new dimensions to the meaning 
of the text that spring from the particular contexts of interpretation. This also 
means that every age and every generation inevitably understands historical 
texts and other embodiments of tradition in a new and unique way, differently 
from their predecessors (Gadamer, 2004, 296; see also Vilhauer, 2010, 55).  
However, the notion of application should not be understood as indicating 
that understanding is arbitrary or entirely determined by particular contexts of 
interpretation. Rather, as Gadamer (2004, 294) emphasizes, understanding is 
always directed toward the meaning of the text and particularly to the truth that 
the text articulates. Hence, Gadamer’s (2004, 309) claim is that an 
interpretation is, in fact, codetermined by two elements. Firstly, we cannot 
disregard the meaning of what is being applied – that is, we cannot interpret the 
text, the moral norm or the law in an arbitrary way as there is something 
normatively binding and true in what the object of interpretation is saying. 
Secondly, however, because of the historical nature of our being, we can 
genuinely understand the meaning of the text, the law or the norm only through 
understanding it from the perspective of our own situation. In other words, we 
can only understand the meaning of the text as a claim of truth upon us and our 
world (Gadamer, 2004, 209; see also Vilhauer, 2010, 120). Understanding thus 
always mediates between the meaning of the text and the particularity of the 
interpreter or, to put it in more general terms, between the past and the present. 
The idea of understanding as mediation between the present and the past, 
however, does not mean that understanding merely serves the continuity of 
tradition. On the contrary, Gadamer argues that historically effected 
understanding is transformative by nature – that is, it transforms the 
interpreter and his or her structure of prejudices. Gadamer’s concept of 
11 Aristotle initially developed the notion of phronesis as a critique of the Platonic notion 
of the Good. According to Aristotle, this notion was empty and abstract and therefore 
meaningless for practical moral deliberation as it did not enable one to choose the 
adequate action in a particular situation that requires moral decision-making. Phronesis 
is for Aristotle the mode of reasoning that allows the mediation between the general, 
abstract moral norm and the concrete situation at hand and thus enables one to act in the 
right way (e.g. Vilhauer, 2010, 121–124). 
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experience (Erfahrung, Gadamer, 2004, 341) describes this transformative 
dimension of understanding. The concept represents the moment in 
understanding when one is surprised and pulled up short in novel and unique 
ways by the text or some other embodiment of tradition, which presents one with 
something entirely new, confusing and unexpected (Lawn, 2006, 62). In this 
sense, genuine experiences are always negative by nature, as they negate one’s 
previously held assumptions and thus make one aware of the limits of 
understanding (Gadamer, 2004, 247, emphasis added). Gadamer’s concept of 
experience therefore radically departs from the notion of experience in the 
empirical sciences where the concept is associated with the idea of accumulation 
of knowledge. The essence of Gadamer’s concept of experience is precisely in its 
unrepeatability and uniqueness. According to Gadamer (2004, 248), experience 
transforms the experiencing person, as whatever is experienced becomes a part 
of the person and his or her worldview and, therefore, the same thing cannot be 
experienced again, at least not in an identical way. In Gadamer’s (2004, 351) 
view, what follows from experiences of negation is openness to new experiences 
and thus being an experienced person means having a radically non-dogmatic 
orientation toward oneself and the world. Experiences teach us that the 
interpretation at which we arrive in understanding is never the final word and 
therefore we must maintain ourselves open to new experiences. Experiences are 
thus ultimately experiences of human finitude, as Gadamer (ibid.) points out. 
According to Gadamer (2004, 298), understanding historical texts involves a 
particular potential for transformative experiences: namely, the text as an 
articulation of the past rarely meets our expectations or anticipated meanings 
and therefore understanding the text does not leave our prejudices intact. As 
Gadamer (2004, 271) emphasizes, we cannot simply understand meanings in an 
arbitrary way and therefore we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meanings if 
the text resists them. This is why Gadamer (2004, 298) speaks of the 
productivity of temporal distance in understanding historical texts and even 
argues that temporal distance can solve the problem of critique in hermeneutics. 
He claims that it is impossible to distinguish between prejudices by which we 
understand from those by which we misunderstand, as long as the structure of 
prejudices that guides our understanding operates unconsciously (ibid.). The 
provocation provided by the unfamiliarity and unexpectedness of the text may 
bring the unconsciously operating prejudices into awareness and thus enable 
their examination. However, as Gadamer (2004, 295) points out, because we are 
ourselves affected by the same tradition to which the text belongs, the text as an 
expression of the past is never entirely unfamiliar to us. Rather, we are already 
in some sense acquainted with the subject matter that the text addresses and 
thus in principle capable of understanding the text’s meaning. As Gadamer 
suggests, understanding takes place in the “polarity of familiarity and 
strangeness” (ibid.) constituted by our belongingness to history on the one hand 
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and by the temporal distance that separates us from the horizon of the text on 
the other. Experiences take place because of the desire to understand the new, 
unexpected and unfamiliar that the text articulates in the light of the familiar 
structure of prejudices that constitutes our being. 
This bears upon one of Gadamer’s most well-known and controversial 
concepts, the “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung, Gadamer, 2004, 
305), which refers to the mediation between the present and the past that takes 
place in the process of understanding. With the concept of “horizon” (Horizont, 
Gadamer, 2004, 301) Gadamer refers to a particular historical perspective or a 
view into the world, “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point” (ibid.). Gadamer (2004, 303) emphasizes that 
it belongs to the historical nature of our being that our historical horizon is not 
fixed, but in principle open to other historical viewpoints and therefore 
continuously transforming, moving and shifting as we come into touch with 
other horizons and understand them. The concept of horizon also involves a 
reflective dimension: Gadamer (2004, 301–302) explains that to have a horizon 
means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond what 
appears as self-evident. In understanding the historical past, having a horizon in 
this sense means acquiring a horizon of inquiry that enables the past to appear 
in its own terms and not merely in terms of our contemporary prejudices and 
criteria (ibid.).12 Understanding thus presupposes sensitivity to the otherness 
and alterity of the other horizon. It requires openness to the claim of truth that 
the past articulates and especially to the yet unknown dimensions of meaning 
that arise from the past and do not conform to our own meanings. 
Understanding the historical past ultimately means allowing the past to address 
us and to present its own claim of truth upon us and our world (Gadamer, 2004, 
370). In this sense, understanding means allowing the past to become 
contemporaneous with us. As Gadamer (2004, 305) himself puts it, 
“understanding is always a fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by 
themselves”. 
Gadamer’s critics have often misunderstood the notion of the fusion of 
horizons and perceived it either as conservative or antagonistic to alterity, 
otherness and difference (e.g. Caputo, 2000, 58; Figal, 2010, 14). As I 
emphasized above, however, for Gadamer the process of understanding 
essentially involves recognizing the otherness of the past, being addressed by it 
and ultimately being transformed through one’s encounters with past horizons. 
12 It is important to point out, however, that understanding the other entirely in its own 
terms is not a genuine possibility for Gadamer, as according to him we can never leave 
behind our structure of prejudices as a totality. Hence, Gadamer’s (2004, 305) point here 
is rather that by remaining open to the foreign dimensions of meaning that arise from the 
text we can become more aware of the presuppositions that govern our own 
understanding. 
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Hence, the fusion of horizons is not a process of mindless assimilation but rather 
a reflective interplay and conversation between the different horizons of the 
present and the past that does not leave either of these horizons intact. In what 
follows, I will illuminate this idea through Gadamer’s conception of the 
dialogical structure of understanding.   
3.3 The dialogical structure of understanding 
Gadamer’s idea of the dialogical structure of understanding derives from his 
philosophy of language and particularly from the idea that the nature of 
language use is dialogical rather than propositional. Instead of representing a 
world-in-itself, propositions are based on prior linguistic agreements that have 
been established in tradition through conversation and dialogue. In other words, 
a word is meaningful not because it simply stands for an object, but rather 
because its meaning is sanctioned by consensus, agreement and convention 
(Gadamer, 2004, 443; Grondin, 1994, 117–120; Grondin, 2003, 130).13 It is also 
essential to Gadamer’s philosophy that language has its genuine being in coming 
to an understanding and in reaching an agreement between two people 
(Gadamer, 2004, 443). Language is the medium through which the 
communality between people is restored in cases when misunderstandings and 
disruptions in consensus emerge. As Gadamer (2004, 371) himself states, “to 
reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself 
forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being 
transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were”. 
Another important feature of Gadamer’s conception of language is that it is 
the medium in which the world is expressed and through which human beings 
have a worldview or a horizon in the first place (Gadamer, 2004, 443). This 
means that human beings can experience the world only as mediated through 
language and thus never capture the world as it exists independently of this 
medium. 14 Accordingly, Gadamer (2004, 444–445) argues that all particular 
13 As Grondin (1994, 119) points out, Gadamer’s dialogical view of language is also in 
accordance with his critique of the modern scientific orientation that has pervaded all 
areas of human existence. Namely, Gadamer’s philosophy of language represents a move 
away from the view of language as a means of control and possession to the understanding 
of language as participation in tradition and in the conversation that we are. As Gadamer 
has it, language is not something that is in one’s conscious control. Therefore it is more 
correct to say that “language speaks us” (Gadamer, 2004, 459) than that we speak 
language. According to Gadamer (ibid.), there is no knowing and choosing consciousness 
over and against the development and use of language. Language ‘happens’ instead of 
being ‘used’. 
14 As Gadamer (2004, 444) explains, in the context of his hermeneutics the whole concept 
of the “world-in-itself” becomes problematic. He further argues that the criterion for the 
continuing expansion of our worldview is not given by a “world-in-itself” that lies beyond 
language. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means 
that whatever language we use we never succeed in grasping anything but an ever more 
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languages open different perspectives onto the world and thus illuminate 
different aspects of it. It is crucial, however, that in Gadamer’s philosophy this 
linguistic mediatedness of the world does not relativize it or make different 
linguistic worldviews radically incommensurable. Gadamer (ibid.) argues that 
because of their linguistic character, all worldviews are open to expansion into 
any other view. Therefore, in so far as particular languages illuminate different 
aspects of the common world, understanding between these linguistic horizons 
is in principle possible. As Gadamer (2004, 443) points out, the world is like a 
“disputed object” placed between those communicating – “the common ground, 
trodden by none and recognized by all, uniting all who talk to one another”. 
As noted above, these views concerning the nature of language are intimately 
associated with Gadamer’s concept of dialogue, which Gadamer primarily 
addresses through the example of the interpretation of historical texts. Gadamer 
(2004, 354–355) emphasizes that in order to genuinely understand the past that 
speaks through the text, we must understand this past as a partner in dialogue, 
as a person or a “Thou”, and allow ourselves to be addressed by it. That is, we 
must understand the horizon of the past as another being who presents its own, 
potentially valid viewpoint on the subject matter in question. According to 
Gadamer (2004, 354), understanding the past in this way is important, because 
a person who seeks to understand the past objectively eliminates the very 
possibility of learning something from it. Namely, denying one’s historical 
preconditionedness by claiming objectivity does not abolish the influence of 
prejudices; rather, it only prevents one from examining how exactly such 
prejudices operate in understanding. Hence, in Gadamer’s (2004, 354–355) 
view, to understand in a genuine sense means to take the claim of truth of the 
past seriously and, by doing so, to make one’s own prejudices available for 
questioning. Only through putting one’s own prejudices into play and at risk 
does one open oneself to the experience of truth involved in understanding 
(Gadamer, 2004, 299). This is why Gadamer (2004, 365) stresses that dialogue 
requires a particular kind of openness and humility before the finitude and 
partiality of human knowledge and before other horizons from which one might 
learn about the limits of understanding. Gadamer calls this orientation “Socratic 
docta ignorantia” (Gadamer, 2004, 356, emphasis added; see also Gjesdal, 
2008, 300), the Socratic knowledge of not knowing. 
However, Gadamer stresses that the purpose of the dialogue is not to 
understand or adopt the views of the past as such. Rather, a genuine dialogue is 
always directed to the truth of the subject matter (die Sache selbst, Gadamer, 
2004, 361, 369, 371, emphasis added), which is the common aim of the dialogue 
extended aspect of the world. Linguistic worldviews are thus not relative in the sense that 
one could oppose them to the “world-in-itself” as if there was a standpoint outside the 
human, linguistic world from which the world as it exists independently of language could 
be captured (ibid.).  
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by which both partners in discussion are oriented and which is placed between 
them like a disputed object. Gadamer (2004, 371) emphasizes that the dialogue 
serves the common aim of reaching an agreement concerning the subject matter 
rather than that of defending one’s own position. Both partners thus give up 
their subjective positions in favour of finding out the truth regarding the matter 
at hand. What takes place in a dialogue is a reflective to-and-fro of question and 
answer, which seeks to find common words and a common language to express 
what is discovered of the subject matter (Gadamer, 2004, 366–367). The focus 
on the subject matter is crucial because it motivates the interlocutors to remain 
open to the other’s claim of truth and thus also to risk their own presuppositions. 
The common focus on the subject matter is thus a precondition for 
understanding and agreement. However, as Barthold (2010, 4) argues, it does 
not guarantee unencumbered access to the ‘things themselves’ and thus it 
functions as a dialogical constraint rather than an epistemological criterion. 
Hermeneutical dialogue results in the event of truth that I have described 
above as the “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 2004, 305) – that is, the emergence 
of a new horizon of meanings or a coming into language of the subject matter. 
As described above, the event of truth establishes a new communion and a unity 
of meaning between the two horizons, thereby also giving the subject matter a 
new articulation. As many commentators have pointed out, despite the centrality 
of the concept of truth for Gadamer, nowhere in his work does he provide an 
explicit account of the concept (Bernstein, 1983, 151; Dostal, 1994, 47; Risser, 
1994, 123). What is evident, however, is that Gadamer (2004, 484) emphasizes 
the event-character of truth in order to distinguish it from the view of truth as a 
static, unchanging or fixed goal towards which understanding progresses.  
In my view, the meaning of Gadamer’s hermeneutical truth concept is 
manifold: firstly, truth refers to the significance that the event of understanding 
has for the interpreter and his or her historical situation. Namely, understanding 
transforms and broadens the interpreter’s horizon, increases his or her self-
understanding and therefore opens for him or her new possibilities of 
understanding. Secondly, however, truth also stands for the deepened and 
enriched understanding of the subject matter under discussion. Although this 
understanding must be regarded as representing only a partial, limited and finite 
truth of the matter, it is nevertheless a truth that surpasses the particular 
perspectives of the past and the present, as it arises from the reflective dialogue 
between them and represents a fusion of these horizons previously existing by 
themselves. As Lawrence Schmidt (1995b, 77) points out, hermeneutical truth is 
not absolute, but rather the kind of truth that can be reached from a particular 
historical perspective and through the encounter with another particular 
horizon. It preserves the possibility of infinite perfectibility of knowledge and 
recognizes our human finitude and fallibility (ibid.). Thirdly, an often neglected 
dimension of Gadamer’s truth concept is the aforementioned truth of the subject 
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matter – die Sache selbst – that functions as a regulative ideal orienting partners 
in dialogue and thus enabling understanding and agreement between them. As 
Barthold (2010, 107) suggests, with this concept, we can read Gadamer as 
describing an idealized event of understanding that is intimately associated with 
the readiness to justify oneself to the other. In my view, this meaning of the 
concept of truth is particularly significant for distinguishing Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics from the radical forms of relativism associated with some of the 
postmodern philosophies. This concept of truth will be addressed in more depth 
in chapters 4 and 5.  
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4 GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS IN DIALOGUE 
WITH MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 
In this chapter, I provide a reinterpretation of the findings of the three studies 
of this thesis in the light of the modernism-postmodernism debate. My purpose 
is thus not to reiterate the exact contents of the studies but rather to 
recontextualize them into the broader framework of this thesis. As I indicated in 
the introduction, situating Gadamer’s philosophy on the modernism-
postmodernism axis is anything but a simple or straightforward task. Among 
other things, Gadamer’s hermeneutics has become a target of opposing critiques 
presented by both modernists and postmodernists (e.g. Schmidt, 1995a). 
Whereas many prominent representatives of modernism, including Habermas 
and Apel, have accused Gadamer of jettisoning the concepts of rationality and 
critique associated with the tradition of the Enlightenment, some 
postmodernists have claimed that Gadamer remains indebted to the tradition of 
metaphysics (ibid.). In the three following sections, I examine Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in relation to Jürgen Habermas’s modernist critical theory and 
John Caputo’s and Richard Rorty’s postmodern philosophies. Through these 
examinations, my aim is to demonstrate that especially the notions of rationality 
and truth in Gadamer’s hermeneutics provide a promising starting point for 
overcoming some of the major philosophical limitations associated with both 
Habermasian modernism and Caputo’s and Rorty’s postmodernist approaches. 
4.1 Gadamer and Habermas’s critical theory 
In this section, I examine Gadamer’s relationship to Jürgen Habermas’s 
philosophy on the basis of the central findings of studies I and II. Firstly, I 
address Habermas’s critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics presented in the 
context of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. I particularly focus on the defence of 
Gadamer’s philosophy against Habermas’s charges of relativism and 
conservatism. Secondly, I examine the relationship between Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics and Habermas’s later philosophy from the perspective of the 
concept of rationality. Finally, I discuss the significance of Gadamer’s concepts 
of tradition and rationality for the philosophy of education on the grounds of my 
findings in study I. 
As Bernstein (1986, 345) argues, Habermas can be regarded as the last great 
rationalist of the Western philosophical tradition and therefore also as one of the 
most prominent modernists of our time. Habermas (1993) has famously stated 
that the purpose of his philosophical programme is to continue the still 
incomplete project of modernity by defending the rational potential of the 
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modern age against the depiction of modernity as a finished epoch. However, it 
is noteworthy that Habermas has continuously emphasized the 
postmetaphysical and postfoundational nature of his philosophy and argued to 
have established a clear break with the tradition of transcendental philosophy 
(e.g. Habermas, 1979, 22–23). In this sense, Habermas represents a modest, 
fallibilist version of modernism or Bernsteinian “objectivism” (Bernstein, 1983, 
8). 
At the time of the Gadamer-Habermas debate in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Habermas’s ambition was to establish a critical theory of society that 
would enable disclosing the pathologies of modern societies and finding 
remedies to them by the means of philosophical and empirical analysis (see 
Habermas, 1988). The primary issue of the debate was the question as to 
whether Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical understanding can provide sufficient 
grounds for the critique of ideology. 15  Habermas’s central concern was that 
Gadamer’s view of the interconnected nature of tradition and hermeneutical 
reflection jeopardizes the primary purpose of reflection, which is to break the 
dogmatism of tradition and to subject the claims of tradition to rational scrutiny 
(Habermas, 1988, 168). According to Habermas (1988, 169–170), the 
inescapably prejudiced nature of understanding prevents hermeneutical 
reflection from acquiring critical distance to the tradition that preconditions it. 
Therefore, hermeneutical reflection becomes inescapably conservative as it is 
limited to rehabilitating the prejudices that function as conditions of the 
possibility of understanding. Moreover, Habermas (1986, 314–315) claims that 
Gadamer’s view of understanding also renders his hermeneutics vulnerable to a 
historicist form of relativism. Namely, according to him, hermeneutical 
understanding lacks a tradition-independent principle of rationality on the basis 
of which the legitimacy of existing traditions could be impartially evaluated.  
The argument that I present in both studies I and II is that Habermas’s 
reading of Gadamer leaves unheeded those dimensions of the concept of 
hermeneutical understanding that make it inherently reflective and self-critical 
(Leiviskä, 2015a, 2015b). These dimensions, as I will later argue, also bring 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics into the proximity of Habermas’s later philosophical 
views. Gadamer evidently puts more emphasis on the historically 
preconditioned nature of our existence than Habermas and, accordingly, rejects 
15  The Gadamer-Habermas debate is generally regarded as consisting of the four 
following essays: the chapter “The Hermeneutic Approach” in Habermas’s On the Logic 
of the Social Sciences (1988, original 1967); Gadamer’s response “Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology: Metacritical Comments on Truth and 
Method” (1986, original 1967); Habermas’s second essay “On Hermeneutics’ Claim to 
Universality” (1986, original 1970); and Gadamer’s final response “Reply to My Critics” 
(1990, original 1971). For more information on the Gadamer-Habermas debate, see 
Hekman, 1986; How, 1995; Hoy, 1982; Nicholson, 1991; Teigas, 1995; Scheibler, 2000; 
Warnke, 1987. 
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the idea that historical prejudices could be entirely surpassed by methodological 
means. However, from Gadamer’s viewpoint, the historicity of understanding 
does not make the critical reflection upon existing prejudgments either 
impossible or unnecessary. Instead, one of the primary reasons for Gadamer’s 
interest in the interpretation of historical texts is the self-reflective potential 
involved in it (see Gadamer, 2004, 298). As I demonstrate in study I, Gadamer 
suggests that the temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the 
historical horizon of the text brings an element of otherness and unfamiliarity 
into the process of understanding (Leiviskä, 2015a). The otherness of the text 
enables understanding to take the form of a reflective dialogue between the 
interpreter and the text and it therefore also allows foregrounding and 
examining the prejudices that govern understanding. This is the reason why 
Gadamer (2004, 298) emphasizes the importance of the interpretation of 
historical texts to our critical self-understanding.  
Hence, although Gadamer does not accept the idea of an Archimedean point 
from which the totality of tradition could be placed under critical reflection at 
once, he does not deny the possibility of critically evaluating the particular 
prejudices that are operative in understanding (Leiviskä, 2015a). From this 
viewpoint, Habermas’s interpretation of the inherently conservative and 
reproductive nature of hermeneutical understanding is accurate only in the very 
limited sense that understanding cannot step out of its historical situatedness as 
a whole. Therefore, while we can consciously examine particular dimensions of 
tradition through dialogical processes of understanding, some other aspects of 
tradition remain effective without our knowledge of them. This, however, does 
not mean that these unconsciously operating prejudices could not be subjected 
to hermeneutical reflection in further processes of understanding. As Gadamer 
(1986, 284) himself points out in the context of the debate, all linguistic 
expressions – including ideological ones – are in principle open to 
hermeneutical understanding as such understanding ultimately encompasses 
everything that enters the medium of language.   
A more difficult question than the issue of conservatism is the one concerning 
the alleged relativism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. According to Habermas, in 
order to avoid relativism, Gadamer’s hermeneutics would require a tradition-
independent principle of rationality equivalent to Habermas’s own principle of 
rational discourse (Habermas, 1986, 314). This issue is addressed in study II in 
which I examine Gadamer’s conception of reason in relation to Habermas’s 
concept of communicative rationality (Leiviskä, 2015b). By the time of the 
Theory of Communicative Action that was originally published in 1981, 
Habermas had made several significant moderations to the views that he held at 
the time of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. One of the most important of these 
moderations was Habermas’s emphasis on the postmetaphysical and 
postfoundational character of his philosophy. As for Gadamer, towards the end 
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of his career, he became increasingly interested in the social and political 
relevance of the hermeneutical processes of understanding. Hence, as Richard 
Bernstein (1986, 348) points out, in his later philosophy, Gadamer began to 
sound more and more like Habermas, whereas the mature Habermas can be 
seen as endorsing distinctively hermeneutical views. Evidently, the questions 
and motivations underlying Habermas’s and Gadamer’s philosophical projects 
were still very different. Whereas Habermas’s major work The Theory of 
Communicative Action can be understood as an attempt to continue the project 
of the Enlightenment in the field of critical theory of society, Gadamer’s 
philosophy is founded upon his critique of the Enlightenment. Despite these 
differences, the argument that I develop in study II is that the conceptions of 
rationality that arise from these philosophical projects sustain significant 
similarities (Leiviskä, 2015b).  
As I explain in study II, Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality 
refers to the rational core of the linguistic practices of modern societies and 
particularly to the counterfactual presuppositions of communicative action and 
argumentation (Leiviskä, 2015b). When Habermas developed the notion of 
communicative rationality, his aim was to establish a non-relativistic concept of 
reason that is nevertheless compatible with the postmetaphysical and 
postfoundationalist currents of thought of twentieth-century philosophy (Cooke, 
1997, 4; Healy, 2007, 137). In Habermas’s philosophy, the notions of 
postmetaphysicality and postfoundationalism are associated with several 
different features of communicative rationality: firstly, Habermas rejects the 
idea of subjective consciousness as the foundation of rationality and replaces this 
view with the idea of the inherently rational character of linguistic, 
intersubjective practices. Secondly, he abandons the idea of abstract rationality 
that can be captured independently of the contingent, historical and social 
practices (Habermas, 1994, 39–48; see also Cooke, 1997, 38–40). Thirdly, 
communicative rationality is procedural instead of substantial, which means 
that it does not concern the rationality of the substantial norms or propositions 
per se but rather the rationality of the procedure for testing their validity 
(Habermas, 1994, 34–39; see also Cooke, 1997, 38–40). Moreover, Habermas 
(1990, 16) also suggests that philosophy can no longer have the role of the 
“supreme judge” that establishes the foundations of knowledge. Rather, 
philosophy must be perceived as providing knowledge from a participant 
perspective of linguistic practices. This idea has led Habermas (1990, 15; Cooke, 
1997, 39) to describe philosophy as a “stand-in” or a “placeholder” for the most 
basic normative presuppositions underlying distinctly modern forms of life.  
Nevertheless, in order to avoid relativism and defeatism, Habermas also aims 
to demonstrate that communicative rationality is not merely another cultural 
and contextual conception of reason. Habermas therefore argues that 
communicative rationality is a species-wide feature of linguistic competence or 
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an implicit know-how common to all linguistically competent, rational subjects 
(e.g. Habermas, 1984, 137; see also McCarthy, 1982, 60). He also seeks to 
illustrate that argumentation is an unavoidable feature of all linguistic 
communities and that participation in argumentative practices requires tacitly 
mastering the idealizing presuppositions of communicative action. 16  In this 
context, following Karl-Otto Apel, Habermas also introduces the famous 
transcendental-pragmatic argument according to which the participants in 
argumentation cannot refute these idealizing presuppositions without falling 
into performative contradiction (e.g. Habermas, 1990, 86–94, 100).17 According 
to Habermas, communicative rationality is thus a universal and an unavoidable 
feature of linguistic competence which, however, only gradually manifests itself 
in the course of the rationalization of societies (e.g. Habermas, 1984, 138, 
emphasis added). Moreover, another important means of defeating relativism 
for Habermas is the argument concerning the unconditionality of validity claims 
(Habermas, 2003, 99). By this, Habermas (ibid.) refers to the idea that although 
factual discourses can only yield more or less well-grounded agreements, the 
claims of truth and morality made by the participants of a discourse always 
transcend all contingent and factual contexts of justification, thereby claiming 
unconditional validity. According to Habermas (2003, 99–101), the idea of 
unconditionality is necessary in order to sustain the distinction between facticity 
and validity. Without such an idea, validity would be reduced to coherence with 
currently held norms and beliefs.  
In study II, the concept of communicative rationality described above is 
paralleled with the Gadamerian notion of dialogical rationality (Leiviskä, 
2015b). Although Gadamer does not use the concept of dialogical rationality 
himself, this notion has been utilized by his commentators in order to emphasize 
the dialogical and justificatory nature of Gadamer’s concept of understanding 
(Bernstein, 1986, 350; Gjesdal, 2009, 11; 2010, 67). Following these 
interpretations, with the concept of dialogical rationality, I refer to such features 
of processes of understanding that enable the reflective examination of 
prejudices and that therefore contribute to the possibility of arriving at justified 
16 Habermas (1990, 89) has outlined these idealizing presuppositions particularly clearly 
in his essay “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Programme of Philosophical Justification”: (1) 
Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; 
(2a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; (2b) Everyone is allowed to 
introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse; (2c) Everyone is allowed to express 
his or her attitudes, desires, and needs; (3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or 
external coercion, from exercising his or her rights as laid down in (1) and (2a–c).  
17 By performative contradiction, Habermas (1990, 88–89) refers to the following idea: 
when one enters into a discourse or an argumentation, one has already made certain 
assumptions and committed oneself to certain norms that characterize a discourse. 
Therefore one cannot argue against those same norms without performatively 
contradicting oneself. The purpose of the argument is thus to demonstrate the 
inescapable or unavoidable nature of the idealizing presuppositions of argumentation. 
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interpretations by the way of dialogue. These features involve (1) openness to the 
claims of truth of others and willingness to test one’s prejudices; (2) engagement 
in the interplay of giving and asking for reasons; and, finally, (3) the regulative 
ideal of the truth of the subject matter as the focus of the dialogue.  
The concept of dialogical rationality is based on similar postmetaphysical and 
postfoundational premises as Habermas’s notion of communicative rationality. 
Like Habermas’s concept, Gadamer’s notion of dialogical rationality can be seen 
as describing the reasonableness or the rational potential embedded in our 
everyday linguistic practices (Bernstein, 1983). Accordingly, Gadamer (2004, 
385) argues that our reasoning is not based on subjective consciousness or 
conducted by individual subjectivities – rather, we are drawn into 
intersubjective processes of understanding and dialogue through our attempts 
to make sense of the other. Furthermore, Gadamer (2004, 282) has continuously 
emphasized the interrelated nature of tradition and reason and highlighted the 
situatedness of hermeneutical reflection in the concrete historical circumstances 
in which we always already find ourselves. Gadamer also insists that because our 
knowledge of the world is restricted to what can be attained through contextual 
and embedded processes of understanding, all interpretations must be regarded 
as finite, fallible, partial and open to further interpretation in other contexts.  
As I argue in study II, despite the profoundly postfoundational orientation of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, certain features of Gadamer’s concept of dialogical 
rationality distance his philosophy from the kind of relativism that Habermas 
associates with it (Leiviskä, 2015b). Namely, at the core of the hermeneutical 
dialogue is the ideal of the truth of the subject matter (die Sache selbst) that 
transcends the given context of interpretation and thus creates a similar 
distinction between facticity and validity as advocated by Habermas (e.g. 
Barthold, 2010, 107). In this context, the truth of the subject matter refers to the 
regulative ideal orienting understanding – that is, the shared goal of truth and 
agreement that allows the dialogue partners to reach beyond their particular 
horizons towards an enriched, deepened and a more justified understanding of 
the subject matter. As Healy (2007, 151) suggests, Gadamer never eschews the 
possibility of or the need for a regulative truth concept capable of giving 
motivation and direction to the dialogical processes of understanding. Rather, 
Gadamer insists upon the necessity of the dialogue partners to justify themselves 
to the other and to surrender their particular positions to the mutual aim of truth 
(Barthold, 2010, 106). As I argue in study II, this idea of dialogue as a 
justificatory process that is oriented by a regulative concept of truth is central 
for defeating the accusations of relativism associated with Gadamer’s philosophy 
(Leiviskä, 2015b).  
Moreover, like Habermas, Gadamer also perceives the rational potential 
embedded in dialogical language use as something universal rather than 
characteristic of specific cultures or historical time periods (e.g. Gadamer, 1986, 
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284). Gadamer’s more or less explicit argument is that because of the universal 
dialogical structure of language use, understanding always involves the 
possibility of arriving at rationally motivated agreements by the way of dialogue 
(Scheibler, 2000, 63). This evidently does not mean that such rational potential 
is always or necessarily realized in understanding. On the contrary, as Gadamer 
(2004, 354) argues, a genuine dialogue requires a fundamental kind of 
openness, humility and willingness to put one’s current pre-understanding at 
risk. The reason Gadamer is so concerned about the intrusion of the objectivistic 
self-understanding of modern sciences into other areas of human existence is 
precisely that it prevents this kind of openness and therefore hinders the 
realization of the rational potential involved in understanding (see Gadamer, 
1981a, 1981b, 1998c).   
As I suggest in study II, the aforementioned features bring the Gadamerian 
concept of dialogical rationality into the proximity of Habermas’s notion of 
communicative rationality and thus also refute or at least significantly weaken 
the accusations of relativism often directed against Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
(Leiviskä, 2015b). The critical argument that I develop against Habermas in 
study II is that certain qualities of Habermas’s own philosophical project 
compromise the postfoundational orientation that he claims to endorse 
(Leiviskä, 2015b). These qualities have to do with the way Habermas 
continuously balances between the transcendental and pragmatic features of his 
philosophical programme, thus rendering his philosophy vulnerable to the kind 
of foundationalism that he aims to avoid (Bernstein, 1983, 193–195). For 
instance, Karl-Otto Apel (1992, 128) argues that Habermas’s theory is openly 
inconsistent, as Habermas seeks to hold on to both, the postfoundational and 
empirical nature of his philosophical programme and the strong justificatory 
function traditionally associated with Kantian philosophy. Apel (ibid.) argues 
that the counterfactual presuppositions of communicative action cannot be 
understood as fallible, testable or falsiable – instead, these presuppositions must 
be regarded as a priori valid. Consequently, Apel (1992, 150) claims that 
Habermas de facto follows a stronger strategy of justification that he would like 
to admit. Apel (ibid.) points out that in the works published after The Theory of 
Communicative Action, including The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(1985/1998), Habermas relies primarily on the so called performative 
contradiction argument, which is a justificatory strategy strongly indebted to 
Kantian transcendentalism. Richard Bernstein (1983, 193–195) and Thomas 
McCarthy (1982, 62) have made similar remarks suggesting that Habermas 
occasionally uses such concepts and language that connect his project to Kantian 
transcendental philosophy, which evidently brings into question the empirical, 
hypothetical and fallible nature of Habermas’s philosophy. 
Because of these ambiguities that place into question the postfoundational 
character of Habermas’s philosophy, I argue in study II that Gadamer’s 
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hermeneutics might provide a more plausible point of departure for developing 
a notion of rationality that is both postfoundational and non-relativistic 
(Leiviskä, 2015b). Moreover, as I further suggest in study II, when Habermas’s 
concept of communicative rationality is given a modest interpretation that 
renounces the aforementioned foundationalist features, this interpretation 
arrives at the proximity of Gadamer’s notion of dialogical rationality. As 
Bernstein (1983, 195) points out, from this modest, hermeneutical viewpoint the 
notion of rationality does not have the status of an ultimate justification or a new 
scientific programme. Rather, it can be regarded as an insight into humanity and 
its prospects, which only calls for our acceptance because of the overall 
plausibility that it gives (ibid.).  
Finally, I now assess the educational relevance of the Gadamerian concept of 
dialogical rationality outlined above. In study I, I suggest that Gadamer’s idea of 
the interrelated nature of tradition and reason allows bringing forth the 
neglected significance of the concept of tradition for the philosophy of education 
(Leiviskä, 2015a). As I indicate in the study, in the philosophy of education, the 
idea of learning as an introduction to traditions or to the views of the past is often 
perceived as conservative and thus incompatible with the educational aim of 
fostering rationality (ibid.). My argument in study I is that through challenging 
the opposition between tradition and reason, Gadamer’s philosophy allows 
illuminating the genuine significance of tradition for education and learning 
(ibid.). Namely, Gadamer suggests that, instead of a dogmatic and irrational 
force, tradition is a conversational partner from which we may learn.  
As I indicate in study I, Gadamer’s understanding of tradition and its value 
for the present departs dramatically from the kind of conservatism that regards 
tradition as an absolute source of validity (Leiviskä, 2015a). Namely, as 
Bernstein (1983, 153) points out, from a Gadamerian perspective, the truth that 
we can derive from our tradition is essentially a discursive truth, which must be 
justified and warranted through dialogue and against the views that we ourselves 
currently hold. Hence, we do not read Aristotle or Plato simply to adopt and 
preserve their views, but we read them because we believe that our reflective 
discussions with these views might teach us something important about 
ourselves and the world. From Gadamer’s perspective, tradition is thus not only 
a medium of being in which we always already find ourselves, but the different 
horizons of the past are also conversational partners that can illuminate our 
prevailing presuppositions and thus allow for their reflective examination 
(Hogan, 2010). As Pádraig Hogan (2010, 129) points out, learning from the past 
is an on-going to-and-fro between one’s own assumptions and those of a 
previously unencountered world of belief and action, which provides fresh 
inspirations for a challenging and deepening of one’s self-understanding (ibid.). 
Hence, although Gadamer emphasizes the historical embeddedness of all 
human practices, including education and learning, he simultaneously stresses 
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that tradition is not a fixed precondition that has a dogmatic hold on us, but it is 
rather in relationship with us and thus plays a central role in our critical self-
understanding (Gadamer, 2004, 293, 352). Namely, although we are temporal 
beings and cannot fully distance ourselves from the pregiven tradition that 
conditions us, achieving a critical perspective on our historicity is nevertheless 
possible through our encounters with those who belong to tradition and history 
but who are also different from us (Leiviskä, 2015a; see also Warnke, 2012, 17). 
In other words, from a Gadamerian viewpoint, reflecting upon one’s historical 
situatedness requires sensitivity and openness to the otherness of the past and 
its ability to tell us something different from what we already think we know 
(Warnke, 2012, 17). From this perspective, the significance of Gadamer’s views 
on tradition and reason for the philosophy of education lies in demonstrating 
that encountering horizons of the past in different educational contexts and 
settings, far from being conservative, plays an important role in fostering 
rationality and self-knowledge. I will return to this idea in the next section where 
I address the educational relevance of the Gadamerian concept of phronesis.  
Interestingly, despite the similarities involved in Gadamer’s and Habermas’s 
notions of rationality, Habermas categorically rejects the aforementioned idea 
of tradition as a conversational partner and as a possible source of truth. In The 
Theory of Communicative Action (1981/1984), Habermas famously introduces 
his theory of the rationalization of societies from the perspective of which the 
historical past can only be understood as a lower stage in the process of 
rationalization and therefore less advanced than contemporary modern 
societies. From a Gadamerian viewpoint, Habermas’s understanding of the 
nature of history is potentially distortive of knowledge, as it elevates modernity 
above other historical ages and thus prevents the present from learning from the 
horizons of the past about the deformations and deficiencies of today’s world 
and society. As Warnke (2012, 16) points out, from a Gadamerian perspective, 
rather than a relationship between a higher and a lower stage, our relationship 
with the past is similar to the relationship between friends and between those in 
solidarity with one another. Just like friends reveal each other to one another, so 
too does the past help structure the way we understand the present and, hence, 
what we hand down to future generations as the past. 
4.2 Gadamer and Caputo’s radical hermeneutics 
In this section, I focus on the relationship of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to another 
postmetaphysical philosophy discussed in study II: John Caputo’s radical 
hermeneutics. I particularly address Caputo’s critique of Gadamer’s concept of 
phronesis and present my own interpretation of this notion, which significantly 
departs from Caputo’s understanding of it. Moreover, I also illuminate the 
significance of the Gadamerian concept of phronesis for the philosophy of 
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education and thus continue the discussion concerning the educational 
relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics initiated in the previous section.  
Along with the confrontation between Gadamer and Derrida, Caputo’s 
critique of Gadamer is one of the most well-known encounters between 
postmodern and philosophical hermeneutics. Caputo is a follower of Heidegger’s 
and Derrida’s philosophies and advocates their critique of the so called 
metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy. One of the important dimensions 
of Caputo’s project, which he refers to as radical hermeneutics, consists of an 
attempt to redefine the concept of rationality from a postmetaphysical 
perspective.18 Caputo (1987, 227) argues that the way reason has been raised to 
the status of a principle in the tradition of metaphysics has reduced it to rule-
governed processes and fixed decision procedures, which can be utilized as 
instruments of discipline and control. Caputo’s radical hermeneutics thus aims 
to emancipate the idea of reason from the metaphysical prejudices involved in it 
and to cultivate an acute sense of the contingency of all social, historical and 
linguistic structures (Caputo, 1987, 209). As Caputo himself argues, his aim is 
not to jettison the concept of reason but rather to redefine it in a manner that 
takes into consideration the futility of all attempts to “nail things down” (Caputo, 
1987, 211). For Caputo, the only sensible way to define reason is in terms of “a 
free, creative movement” or “play” (ibid.). By these notions, he refers to the 
activity of making unorthodox suggestions to existing paradigms, breaking 
established habits of thought and defending the freedom of reason against all 
attempts to capture it in fixed principles (Caputo, 1987, 227).  
As indicated in study II, Caputo (1987, 110–111, 210) perceives Gadamer’s 
rehabilitation of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis as an attempt analogous 
to his own to redefine reason from a postmetaphysical perspective. He correctly 
recognizes that, in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, reason is emancipated from the 
rule of method and reinterpreted in a manner that takes into account the 
plasticity and flexibility involved in situated, historical understanding (Caputo, 
1987, 110, 210). His critical argument is, however, that despite its seemingly 
historical orientation, Gadamer’s notion of phronesis is ultimately based on the 
idea of the transmission of fixed, eternal truths or meanings (Caputo, 1987, 110, 
113–115). Caputo (1987, 113) suggests that the Gadamerian concept of die Sache, 
the subject matter, stands for such ahistorical truths or essences. He further 
argues that the real question motivating Gadamer’s philosophical project is how 
these ahistorical truths and meanings are passed on and transmitted in 
18 For Caputo, the term ‘postmetaphysical’ has a profoundly different meaning than it 
does for Habermas. Whereas Habermas sustains the universality of reason and endorses 
the modernist ideals of truth, objectivity and consensus, Caputo advocates a far more 
postmodern orientation. For Caputo, a postmetaphysical approach refers to the radical 
critique of such foundational and principled thinking that Heidegger and Derrida 
associated with the tradition of metaphysics.  
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understanding in a manner that secures the deep unity and continuity of 
tradition (Caputo, 1987, 111). According to Caputo (ibid.), Hegelian dialectics 
and Platonic dialogues are important for Gadamer mainly for the reason that he 
perceives dialogue and dialectics as the primary means for transmitting the 
ageless contents of tradition. Caputo (1987, 111) argues that the central 
difference between Gadamer and Hegel is not that Gadamer’s philosophy lacks 
an absolute but rather that Gadamer recognizes that the very structure of history 
“prevents the absolute instantiation of the absolute”. Because of this, in 
Gadamer’s philosophy, the self-same truth can only be expressed in historical 
terms and captured in inexhaustibly new ways in different historical situations 
(ibid.). Caputo (1987, 115) concludes that Gadamer’s thinking represents a 
modified, historical form of Hegelianism and thus it remains fundamentally 
attached to “the metaphysics of recollection and mediation”, which “dulls the 
edge of destruction and deconstruction”.  
As I argue in study II, Caputo’s reading of Gadamer described above 
disregards the central purpose of Gadamer’s rehabilitation of the Aristotelian 
notion of phronesis, which is precisely to highlight the inescapably contextual 
and historical nature of understanding (Leiviskä, 2015b). Gadamer emphasizes 
that understanding the meaning of the text or some other embodiment of 
tradition in some universal, ahistorical or objective sense is impossible, because 
understanding always arises from the prejudices and questions connected to the 
interpreter’s particular historical situation (e.g. Gadamer, 2004, 300). 
Accordingly, the text does not have any meaning outside its concrete, historical 
interpretations, as it only receives such meaning through its concretization in 
the event of understanding. This is why Gadamer (2004, 306) insists that 
understanding is inherently applicative by which he means that we inescapably 
understand the text’s meaning as always already applied to ourselves and to our 
situation. For Gadamer, the primary purpose of the concept of phronesis is thus 
to emphasize that our reasoning is not something foreign to or independent of 
our concrete existence in history. 
Granted, Gadamer emphasizes that understanding is always directed to “the 
truth of the subject matter” (die Sache selbst, Gadamer, 2004, 369). However, 
in the context of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the concept of die Sache does not 
refer to some fixed or pregiven essence handed down by tradition, as Caputo 
(1987, 113) seems to suggest. Rather, die Sache or the subject matter is simply 
the common reference point between the interpreter and the text that enables 
understanding in the first place. As Gadamer (2004, 295) points out, because we 
ourselves are affected by history, we are always already in some sense familiar 
with the subject matter that the text concerns and thus in principle capable of 
understanding the text’s meaning. However, if we bring to mind the idea that 
understanding is a dialogical process that occurs in the dialogical interplay 
between the interpreter and the text, it becomes evident that the nature and the 
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meaning of die Sache is not something fixed or predetermined but rather being 
worked out and negotiated in the course of the dialogue. The truth of the subject 
matter is thus an ideal goal of dialogue that points beyond the interpreter’s 
pregiven horizon and motivates the interpreter to enter into a dialogue with the 
text, to put his or her own preconceptions at risk and to justify him or herself in 
the light of the truth claims that the text presents. In this sense, as Barthold 
(2010, 102) argues, the focus on die Sache distinguishes genuine dialogues from 
other forms of conversation as it secures the fundamental openness of 
understanding and prevents it from becoming arbitrary or idiosyncratic. 
Bernstein (1983, 151) expresses the same thing as he points out that the appeal 
to truth is what enables us to go beyond our own historical horizon through a 
fusion of horizons. Hence, this dimension of truth is absolutely essential in order 
to distinguish philosophical hermeneutics from a historicist form of relativism 
(ibid.).  
In my view, Caputo misinterprets Gadamer’s notion of phronesis precisely 
because he does not fully capture the genuinely dialogical nature of the concept. 
Accordingly, he does not understand the role that the concept of truth plays in 
dialogical processes of understanding. For Gadamer, the dimension of truth is 
important for demonstrating that despite its applicative nature, understanding 
is never solely self-interested or locked into a perspective. That is, the aim of 
understanding is not to interpret the text according to our own criteria, but 
rather to engage in a common pursuit of truth and meaning with the text, 
thereby also putting our own prejudices into play. At the same time, however, 
Gadamer emphasizes that what can actually be attained through processes of 
understanding is not an absolute, ahistorical truth but the truth mediated by our 
concrete existence in history. Namely, it is our interpretative situation and the 
prejudices connected to it that enable understanding in the first place (Gadamer, 
2004, 398). This dialectical interplay between the universal and the particular 
dimensions of understanding – between the truth that we pursue in a dialogue 
and our own historical situation – is what Gadamer aims to capture with the 
notion of phronesis.  
Caputo’s misinterpretation of the notion of phronesis also characterizes his 
understanding of the political implications of the concept: as I point out in study 
II, both Caputo (1987, 210–211) and Bernstein (1983, 157) argue that Gadamer’s 
concept of phronesis is ultimately incompatible with the conditions of 
contemporary societies, because the concept rests upon an idea of a pregiven 
paradigm or a “world already in place” (Caputo, 1987, 210) which, according to 
them, is irreversibly lost in today’s plural societies. In my view, however, the way 
Gadamer associates phronesis with the idea of dialogue adds a new dimension 
to the Aristotelian concept that makes it much more plausible from a 
contemporary perspective. Namely, in Gadamer’s interpretation of phronesis, 
the idea of a fixed paradigm or a pre-existing truth is replaced with the idea of a 
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consensus that is being sought after in the course of the dialogue. Hence, for 
Gadamer, the paradigm or the tradition that phronesis rests upon is not fixed or 
predetermined, but it is rather something that is continuously revised, 
reinterpreted and reconstructed within dialogical encounters between different 
horizons and perspectives. 
As I point out in study II, as Caputo’s philosophy lacks a concept of truth 
parallel to Gadamer’s, it is difficult to see how Caputo himself is able to escape 
from radically relativistic, idiosyncratic or arbitrary consequences (Leiviskä, 
2015b). Caputo argues that he does not want to jettison reason and is emphatic 
that interpretation is not arbitrary, but if rationality has no goal other than 
“coping with the flux” (Caputo, 1987, 213) what exactly is the meaning of reason? 
What makes the transformation and disruption of existing paradigms 
specifically rational? As Paul Fairfield (2011, 200) points out, when it comes to 
identifying the conditions that would render understanding rational, Caputo 
offers merely negative descriptions. As I argue in study II, without some positive, 
constructive understanding of what it means to be rational and how it is possible 
to arrive at justified interpretations, the concept of rationality loses its critical 
potential and ultimately becomes meaningless (Leiviskä, 2015b). In my view, the 
strength of Gadamer’s concept of phronesis is precisely that it sustains the 
critical potential of reason without making such metaphysical or essentialist 
assumptions that Caputo mistakenly associates with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
Hence, the argument that I present in study II is that we can sustain the non-
dogmatism and openness of reason that Caputo strives for from Gadamer’s more 
moderate standpoint and simultaneously avoid the arbitrariness that Caputo’s 
own philosophy appears to be vulnerable to (Leiviskä, 2015b).  
In study I, I discuss the educational relevance of Gadamer’s notion of 
phronesis and suggest that the concept is particularly fruitful for understanding 
the educational aim of rationality without losing sight of the profoundly 
historical and contextual nature of education and learning (Leiviskä, 2015a). As 
I indicate in the study, education is always already embedded in the medium of 
tradition and effected by history (ibid.). What follows from this is that education 
both intentionally and unintentionally transmits traditional contents to 
learners, thus endowing them with historical preunderstandings. From a 
Gadamerian perspective, however, it also belongs to the historicity of human 
existence that each generation understands tradition from the viewpoint of its 
unique historical situation and thus differently from previous generations. 
Hence, what is demanded of learners and what education ultimately aims to 
foster is the kind of situated rationality – phronesis – that allows learners to 
form reasonable reinterpretations of the subject matters mediated through 
tradition (ibid.). 
As Shaun Gallagher (1992, 150) points out, such situated reasoning or 
learning is always faced with two normative claims: one by the object of 
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interpretation and one by the interpreter’s own circumstance. In other words, 
learning is codetermined by the learner’s unique historical situation – that is, 
the specific issues, interests and requirements associated with it – and the 
subject matter being learned. Learning is an attempt to responsibly bridge 
between these demands or an endeavour to resolve, in a meaningful way, the 
tension created by the uniqueness of the learner’s historical situation and the 
subject matter transmitted through tradition. An idea of learning that merely 
appropriates and reproduces tradition is not only dogmatic and conservative but 
also a bad caricature of Gadamerian thinking. At the same time, however, 
reasonable learning cannot simply make an aspect of tradition or the subject 
matter to fit one’s current circumstance, as new interpretations of a given subject 
matter always build upon old ones and make use of the knowledge of the 
limitations and deficiencies involved in past interpretations. In other words, 
while learning is preconditioned by the tradition of interpretations that has gone 
before it also strives for new, enriched and deepened understandings of a given 
subject matter.  
Notably, the learner never encounters some abstract ‘subject matter’ in 
education but, instead, what is handed down to the learner is a particular 
historical interpretation of a given subject matter in the form of a text or some 
other embodiment of tradition. Therefore, phronetic learning takes the form of 
a dialogue or a conversation between the learner and the particular historical 
horizon of the text (Leiviskä, 2015a; see also Gallagher, 1992, 154). Hence, the 
two normative demands that the learner faces are ultimately the claim of truth 
arising from one’s own prejudices on the one hand and from the horizon of the 
text on the other. Phronetic learning thus means allowing one’s own prejudices 
to be questioned by the text and, vice versa, questioning and evaluating the 
claims of truth of the text against one’s own prejudices. Moreover, as I have 
emphasized, in order to be rational along the lines suggested by phronesis, such 
learning is always oriented by the regulative ideal of the truth of the subject 
matter that allows the learner to strive for such understanding and agreement 
with the text that overcomes the particularities of both horizons and discloses 
previously unknown dimensions of meaning.   
The outcome of such learning is a new interpretation of a given subject matter 
under discussion, which also represents an increase in the learner’s freedom and 
self-understanding. This interpretation, however, is only a temporal 
achievement in the unending process of learning, as it will inevitably be 
overcome and replaced as the learner’s horizon shifts through further processes 
of learning. As I indicated earlier through Gadamer’s concept of experience, each 
event of understanding transforms the learner in a manner that every new 
process of learning begins with a different hermeneutical situation and thus 
brings about a different dialogue. Therefore, processes of learning must be 
regarded as radically open-ended and also as engendering inexhaustibly new 
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interpretations of different subject matters. In this sense, learning does not 
strive for any pre-given, ahistorical or fixed end, but it is rather an end in itself 
and a continuous task for human beings. Gadamer (2004, 15) himself has 
described this fundamental open-endedness of learning through his notion of 
Bildung, by which he means the continuous endeavour of humans to rise above 
their partiality toward greater universality and communality.   
The relevance of Gadamer’s concept of phronesis to the philosophy of 
education thus lies in demonstrating that the rationality that education aims to 
foster is not something foreign to the historical being of humans. Rather, it is 
something that can only be employed from a participant perspective of a 
historical tradition and in the light of one’s historical situation. Fostering 
phronesis in education ultimately means fostering openness toward other 
historical horizons and their claims of truth through which the learner may gain 
a deepened understanding of one’s own historical situation and of the subject 
matter at hand. Moreover, fostering phronesis must also involve familiarizing 
the learners with the finitude and partiality of the views and interpretations that 
they encounter in education, as it is not these particular interpretations that they 
must accept and conform to. Rather, the claims of truth arising from these other 
historical horizons should be understood as invitations to enter into dialogues 
with them in which a common understanding of the world that lies before both 
conversational partners can be pursued. Hence, the ideal of truth that orients 
our dialogues with different embodiments of tradition is not the learner’s, the 
educator’s or the tradition’s truth, but rather a truth where all these horizons 
could meet on common ground.  
4.3 Gadamer and Rorty’s neopragmatism 
In this section, I examine the relationship between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and 
Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism on the basis of the findings of study III. 
I particularly focus on the topics of the philosophy of science and science 
education, which were addressed in the study. My aim is to demonstrate that, 
despite some important similarities in Gadamer’s and Rorty’s philosophies, 
there are also differences in these approaches that are central from the viewpoint 
of the philosophy of science as well as science education. I suggest that the most 
important of these differences is that Gadamer sustains the notion of truth as 
the regulative ideal of inquiry, while Rorty adopts a far more pragmatic 
orientation. I argue that Rorty’s neopragmatic approach is ultimately 
insufficient for motivating the openness and non-dogmatism of scientific 
research and for promoting the kind of expansion of one’s community of 
justification that Rorty himself advocates.   
Rorty became a prominent figure in late twentieth-century philosophy after 
the publication of his main work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979. 
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In this book, Rorty establishes his famous anti-foundationalism,19 which refers 
to the idea that there is no neutral framework of inquiry or a foundation of 
knowledge on the basis of which justified beliefs can be distinguished from 
unjustified ones. Rather, all criteria and procedures of justification must be 
regarded as local and inherent in a given community (Rorty, 1980). Underlying 
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism is the rejection of the “mirror theory of knowledge” 
(ibid.) by which Rorty refers to the idea that there is an intrinsically veridical 
relationship between mind or language and the world. Rorty thus discards the 
representational view of language and seeks to replace it with the pragmatist 
idea of different vocabularies as alternative modes of adaptation to the world.   
Rorty has also employed these basic ideas established in his main work in his 
critique of the natural sciences. In his essay “Science as Solidarity”, Rorty (1991b, 
35) challenges the idea of the natural sciences as disciplines capable of providing 
objective knowledge of the world or of having insights into the intrinsic nature 
of reality. He argues that there is no reason to think of sciences as having a 
privileged access to the nature in itself or as being any more objective or rational 
than any other discipline (Rorty, 1991b, 39). Accordingly, Rorty (1991c, 48–49) 
also claims that the world does not provide a normative constraint on our belief 
systems. Therefore, there is no way to determine the superiority of one scientific 
paradigm over another, to translate relevant proportions of one vocabulary into 
another or even argue against one paradigm on the basis of the beliefs of another 
(ibid.). All these claims are interlinked with Rorty’s suggestion that we should 
ultimately reject such notions as ‘truth’ or ‘world’ as the goals of scientific 
research and replace them with the attempt to enlarge one’s own community of 
justification (Rorty, 1991b, 41; 1995, 298). The view that Rorty (1991a, 23) refers 
to as “ethnocentrism” is also closely related to these arguments. Rorty (ibid.) 
describes ethnocentrism as the conviction that “there is nothing to be said about 
either truth or justification apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of 
justification which a given society – ours – uses in one or another area of 
inquiry”. Rorty (1991a, 30) thus accepts the idea of “a lonely provincialism” – 
that is, the idea that we are unable to justify ourselves to people who are very 
different from us and therefore there will be an inevitable distinction between 
“the people to whom one must justify one’s beliefs and the others” (ibid.). 
As I have suggested earlier, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics also 
represents a form of postfoundationalism: as all knowledge claims and forms of 
understanding are fundamentally historical and linguistic, there is no neutral 
foundation upon which these claims and forms can be conclusively justified. The 
denial of the possibility of such a foundation is the very backbone of Gadamer’s 
philosophical project. Gadamer (2004) also emphasizes the linguistic 
19 In this context, I use Rorty’s (1980) own term “anti-foundationalism”, which bears 
similarities to but is not identical with the postfoundationalism that Gadamer endorses. 
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mediatedness of our worldview by which he means that we can only experience 
and understand the world as it is expressed through the medium of language. 
Moreover, Gadamer criticizes the expansion of the methodical orientation of the 
natural sciences into other areas of human existence, including the human 
sciences (e.g. Gadamer, 1981b, 2004). In the light of these Gadamerian ideas, it 
is not surprising that in the Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty (1980, 
360) presents Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a model for his own philosophical 
project. Rorty (ibid.) argues that Gadamer shares his view of the “edifying” 
nature of philosophy as opposed to its more traditional, “systematic” function. 
Edification – Rorty’s translation of the German term Bildung – as a 
philosophical attitude stands for the rejection of the epistemological 
preoccupation with truth and justification in favour of a conversational attitude. 
According to Rorty (ibid.), fostering conversation, inventing new narratives and 
exploring different possibilities and modes of self-description is a sufficient aim 
for philosophy. Rorty (1980, 359) argues that, like himself, Gadamer also adopts 
an attitude “interested not so much in what is out there in the world, or in what 
happened in history, as in what we can get out of nature and history for our own 
uses”. However, as Bernstein (1983, 201), Robert Dostal (1987, 423) and Warnke 
(1987, 146, 161–166) among others have argued, there are significant differences 
in Gadamer’s and Rorty’s philosophies that distinguish Gadamer from the kind 
of radical renunciation of truth that Rorty’s philosophy represents.20 
As indicated earlier, according to Gadamer, understanding is always directed 
to the truth of the subject matter or die Sache selbst. As Dostal (1987, 428) 
suggests, for Gadamer, the notion of the subject matter is a regulative ideal or a 
telos for speech and dialogue and, in its largest possible sense, it refers to the 
assumption of a common world. According to David Weberman (1999, 325) 
Gadamer holds that understanding is not a dyadic, but a triadic relation – that 
is, it is not a relation simply between text and reader or between one interlocutor 
and another, but between two thinking subjects and the truth about some subject 
matter. Therefore, conversational as well as textual understanding occurs by 
grasping and evaluating the other’s words in the light of the truth about the way 
things are or should be (ibid.). In this context, however, the truth of the subject 
matter does not refer to something that lies beyond the interpretational human 
world. Rather, as Nicholas Davey (2006, 70) suggests, die Sache is a continuity 
of interpretations which in coalescing over time forms a common cultural theme 
or a reference point. Hence, it is an ideal construct formed from a cluster of 
20 In this context, I will highlight somewhat different aspects of Gadamer’s philosophy 
than initially introduced in study III. Namely, I want to emphasize here that Gadamer’s 
commitment to the idea of a common world and the view of understanding as a pursuit 
of truth can be seen as features that clearly distinguish Gadamer’s hermeneutics from 
Rortyan thinking. 
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evolving perspectives.21 It is characteristic of a subject matter that it cannot be 
exhausted by any single interpretation and that it does not have any fixed being, 
but it is rather continuously transforming and shifting through new 
interpretations. In this sense, die Sache is not an object of investigation but, as 
Dostal (1987, 421) points out, it is an enterprise in which we ourselves 
participate. The fact that understanding is directed to the truth of the subject 
matter therefore does not mean that understanding can grasp the world-in-itself 
unmediated by language. For Gadamer, the relevance of the concept of die Sache 
is rather that it provides a common ground or reference point for the 
interlocutors and thus prevents the dissolution of understanding into a mere 
juxtaposition between different interpretations (Vasterling, 2003, 164). Hence, 
although every worldview can provide only a partial and limited perspective onto 
the world, the assumption that all linguistic interpretations are nevertheless 
about the same subject matter or the same world and seek to disclose its truth 
enables dialogue and conversation between these different worldviews. The 
world or the subject matter is, as Gadamer (2004, 443) states, like a disputed 
object set before those communicating. “It is the common ground, trodden by 
none and recognized by all, uniting all who talk to one another” (ibid.).  
My argument is that this Gadamerian ideal of truth departs radically from 
Rorty’s ethnocentric orientation. Namely, Rorty’s idea seems to be that as we can 
never actually separate between truth and what we are justified in believing 
within a given community, we should abandon the notion of truth or assimilate 
it with what is justified based on our criteria (Rorty, 1991a, 23; 1991b, 38). In 
contrast to this, although Gadamer also accepts that we have no access to the 
world-in-itself, he insists that the regulative ideal of the truth of the subject 
matter – that is, the ideal of a common, linguistically mediated view of the world 
– remains crucial for understanding. Namely, it secures the openness of
21 It is important to acknowledge that Gadamer rejects both direct realism as well as 
Kantian representationalism. Accordingly, the concept of die Sache selbst should not be 
confused with the Kantian thing-in-itself, which stands outside the world of 
interpretation. As Gadamer (2004, 444; see also Dostal, 1987, 420; 2012, 59) himself 
indicates, die Sache selbst is a phenomenological concept that he adopts from Husserl: 
“Seen phenomenologically, the ‘thing-in-itself’ is, as Husserl has shown, nothing but the 
continuity with which the various perceptual perspectives on objects shade into one 
another […]. In the same way as with perception we can speak of the ‘linguistic shadings’ 
that the world undergoes in different language-worlds. But there remains a characteristic 
difference: every ‘shading’ of the object of perception is exclusively distinct from every 
other, and each helps co-constitute the ‘thing-in-itself’ as the continuum of these 
nuances—whereas, in the case of the shadings of verbal worldviews, each one potentially 
contains every other one within it—i.e., each worldview can be extended into every other. 
It can understand and comprehend, from within itself, the ‘view’ of the world presented 
in another language” (Gadamer, 2004, 444–445). Based on this Husserl-inspired 
description, die Sache selbst is the continuum or the totality of mutually inclusive 
worldviews or, differently put, the fusion of horizons between all possible perspectival 
views on the subject matter.  
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understanding, motivates dialogue between rival perspectives and paradigms 
and ultimately makes understanding between these perspectives possible in the 
first place. From a Gadamerian viewpoint, the ethnocentric idea of truth as 
‘validity-for-us’ is insufficient for ensuring the openness of understanding 
towards other, radically different horizons and thus for enabling such expansion 
of our community of justification that Rorty himself also advocates. As Dostal 
(1987, 424) notes, the assumption of the shared world is the bridge that makes 
possible the conversation of mankind that Rorty, in his own way, would like to 
promote. Habermas (1998b, 375) also makes a similar point as he suggests that, 
as soon as the regulative notion of truth is eliminated in favour of a pragmatic 
validity-for-us, the rational motive to seek agreement beyond the boundaries of 
one’s own community is missing. In other words, without a regulative truth 
concept, there would be no motivation to enter into dialogues with 
representatives of other cultures or paradigms, to take their claims seriously or 
to allow one’s own beliefs to be tested in the process.  
Therefore, although Gadamer also suggests that understanding is always 
applicative and thus necessarily motivated by certain questions and interests of 
a particular horizon, his point is not to say that understanding is only answerable 
to these interests and concerns. Rather, Gadamer (2004, 298–299) argues that 
it is pivotal for our ability to learn and transform – in Rortyan terms, to be edified 
– that we subject ourselves to dialogues with horizons and perspectives that
place into question our initial viewpoints and criteria. It is also central that we 
take the arguments of our dialogue partners to be genuine claims of truth about 
the subject matter, which can potentially illuminate something about this matter 
that we did not ourselves know. Therefore, from a Gadamerian perspective, the 
pursuit of truth in which we are engaged cannot be identified with the Rortyan 
pursuit of intersubjective agreement among the members of one’s own 
community, even if this involves the hypothetical idea that one’s community of 
justification can be enlarged (Rorty, 1991b, 38).22   
In my view, these differences between Rorty’s and Gadamer’s philosophies 
are particularly crucial from the perspective of the philosophy of science. Rorty 
(1991b, 39) also advocates the idea of scientific research as a pursuit of “unforced 
agreement” and “free and open encounter”. However, if Rorty’s ethnocentric 
ideas were to prevail, it is difficult to understand what would motivate scientists 
22 In some connections, Rorty (e.g. 1995, 283) speaks of the “cautionary use” of the 
concept of truth to point out that justification is relative to an audience and therefore we 
cannot exclude the possibility that there is some audience to which the belief that is 
currently justifiable to us would not be justifiable. As Misak (2010, 38) points out, this 
“cautionary use” of the concept of truth runs counter to the earlier Rortyan view that 
assimilates truth to justification. Misak (ibid.) argues that the “cautionary use” of the 
concept of truth ultimately leads to a thought that Rorty is “loathe to accept”, as it points 
to something towards which we aim that goes beyond what seems right to us here and 
now. 
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to test their theories or to seek agreement beyond the paradigms and theories 
that they currently hold.23 From a Gadamerian perspective, it is precisely the 
pursuit of truth regarding the common world or a given subject matter, 
accompanied by an awareness of the finitude and fallibility of knowledge that 
secures the openness of scientific communities and thus also enables the 
expansion of knowledge. Adopting a hermeneutical perspective on the natural 
sciences evidently means accepting that even the sciences do not have an 
unmediated access to the world-in-itself. However, this hermeneutical 
awareness does not mean denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge of the 
world. Rather, it means acknowledging that this knowledge is mediated, 
perspectival, limited and correctible. Consequently, as I suggest in study III, 
obtaining a hermeneutical orientation to the natural sciences indicates a 
commitment to the idea of fallibilism as a guiding principle of scientific research 
(Leiviskä, 2013). As I further suggest in the study, the idea of fallibilism is 
already encoded within the natural sciences themselves and, therefore, 
incorporating hermeneutical insights into the philosophy of science does not 
contrast with the ideas already endorsed within the natural sciences (ibid.). 
Instead, Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be perceived as providing a more nuanced 
understanding of the hermeneutical conditions underlying scientific fallibilism 
(ibid.).  
Unlike for Rorty, for Gadamer the primary problem regarding the modern 
sciences is not the quest for objectivity and knowledge or even the use of the 
scientific method. Rather, Gadamer’s concern – which I only briefly touch upon 
in the concluding part of study III – is the way this rather narrow field of 
knowledge possessed by the modern sciences has become the predominant form 
of knowledge within modern societies (Gadamer, 1981b, 72–73). From 
Gadamer’s viewpoint, there is nothing wrong with the ideal of objectivity or the 
use of the scientific method as long as they remain within the sphere of the 
natural sciences. It is only when these ideals and methods pervade areas to 
which they are profoundly foreign – such as the human sciences – that they 
become potentially distortive of knowledge. Namely, in Gadamer’s view, the 
mode of knowledge characteristic of the human sciences is the practical 
knowledge of ‘the good life’, which cannot be attained through the use of 
authorized methods, but rather through such processes of understanding that 
Gadamer himself describes (Gadamer, 1981d, 114–117). The purpose of 
understanding is ultimately to help us toward a conception of the good life to 
23  Evidently, also for Rorty there are certain pragmatic criteria based on which old 
theories should be replaced with new ones. These criteria have to do with the efficacy of 
scientific theories as means of prediction and control. However, as scientific theories are 
always underdetermined by data and facts, Rorty’s pragmatic view fails to explain why 
rival theories both supported by the evidence at hand should strive for a common 
understanding of the world.  
57 
which also the sciences, in a broad sense, should be answerable (Gadamer, 
1981a, 11–12). Hence, according to Gadamer, the primary problem with modern 
sciences is that their methodical orientation guided by a technical interest has 
become predominant in the human sciences and thus replaced the quest for 
practical knowledge. 
Hence, although Gadamer’s philosophy begins with similar postfoundational 
premises as Rorty’s neopragmatism, Gadamer’ hermeneutics has much less 
dramatic consequences for scientific research, as it does not deprive such inquiry 
of its ultimate motivation or label this inquiry as misguided. This difference 
between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Rortyan neopragmatism is not only 
important from the viewpoint of the philosophy of science, but also from the 
perspective of science education. Namely, in the field of science education, there 
has recently been a growing interest in the ‘human factors’ – that is, the social, 
historical, linguistic and political features – involved in scientific research and 
science education. However, this interest has also given rise to a legitimate 
concern that some approaches, postmodernist stances in particular, 
overemphasize these ‘human factors’ to the extent that leads to a dramatic 
distortion of science to a form unrecognizable to many (Loving, 1997, 435; 
Schulz, 2007, 635).  
The benefit of applying Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the field of science 
education is precisely that it allows acknowledging the hermeneutical (historical 
and linguistic) features of scientific research and science education without 
jeopardizing the motivation or legitimacy of these disciplines (Leiviskä, 2013). 
From a Gadamerian perspective, the aim of science education is to foster a 
genuine desire for knowledge in learners which, however, must be accompanied 
by an understanding of the fundamental fallibility and infinite perfectibility of 
both scientific knowledge and one’s own understanding of the world (Gadamer, 
1998b, 68–69). In study III, I refer to this orientation as fallibilistic and radically 
non-dogmatic (Leiviskä, 2013). As the aim of science education, such orientation 
eschews the narrow, calculative and technical attitude sometimes associated 
with natural scientific research, which is also the attitude that Gadamer himself 
was constantly concerned about. Namely, through cultivating a desire for truth 
and simultaneously demonstrating how our knowledge of the world is 
fundamentally finite and limited, hermeneutic science education prevents 
learners from perceiving the world as a mere controllable object.  
Such hermeneutical orientation to science education also shuns the Rortyan 
pragmatic idea that sciences only serve the local goal of finding better ways of 
coping. Moreover, it is also in contrast with the Rortyan ethnocentric implication 
that the knowledge that sciences produce is ultimately justifiable only to a 
community of like-minded researchers. Although Rorty (1991b, 41) also suggests 
that we should remain open to other, better suggestions, the motivation 
underlying such openness is fundamentally different than in Gadamer’s 
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hermeneutics. Namely, it is not driven by the desire to know the world or the 
truth of the subject matter, which for Gadamer motivates our unending 
processes of understanding and inquiry. Instead, it is oriented by a much more 
local and ethnocentric concern for finding ways of adjusting that better serve the 
current purposes of one’s own community. Such a pragmatic interest does not 
necessarily secure the openness and non-dogmatism of scientific research or, 
more importantly, provide knowledge of the world in the sense intended by 
Gadamer. Namely, as Dostal (2012, 61) suggests, from Gadamer’s perspective, 
although our knowledge of the world is always perspectival and partial, it is 
nevertheless knowledge based on our sincere attempts to understand the truth 
of the world through our dialogues with others.  
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5  BEYOND MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 
In this chapter, my aim is to draw together the central findings of the three 
studies of this thesis as well as the findings presented in chapter 4. I also 
introduce some new insights in order to provide responses to the comprehensive 
research questions of this thesis. In chapter 5.1, I summarize the central findings 
regarding Gadamer’s relationship to Habermasian modernism and the 
postmodernist philosophies of Caputo and Rorty, focusing particularly on 
Gadamer’s concepts of dialogical rationality and the truth of the subject matter. 
In chapter 5.2, I examine the relevance of these findings to the philosophy of 
education. In particular, my aim is to demonstrate that Gadamer’s philosophy 
circumvents some of the philosophical problems and limitations associated with 
the modernist and postmodernist philosophies of education and therefore it 
might offer a more defensible warrant for educational theory and practice than 
that provided by these standpoints. Finally, in chapter 5.3, I discuss some of the 
limitations of the studies and introduce possibilities for future research. 
5.1 The central findings of the studies 
As the findings of the three studies indicate, Gadamer’s hermeneutics cannot be 
unproblematically classified as either ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’. Rather, as I 
have demonstrated, Gadamer’s philosophy is engaged in an attempt to redefine 
the concepts of rationality, knowledge and truth in a manner that departs from 
foundationalism and objectivism without, however, trivializing or relativizing 
these notions. In this sense, as Richard Bernstein (1983, 1986) among others has 
shown, Gadamer’s philosophy significantly contributes to the movement beyond 
such dichotomies as modernism-postmodernism and objectivism-relativism.  
Gadamer’s concept of dialogical rationality introduced in study II is an 
example of such contribution. In contrast to the Enlightenment notion of 
rationality, Gadamer outlines an idea of situated reason that is embedded in the 
dialogical structure of language use (Leiviskä, 2015a, 2015b). As I argue in study 
II, dialogical rationality is a postmetaphysical (in a Habermasian sense) and a 
postfoundational conception of reason (Leiviskä, 2015b). This means, among 
other things, that such reason cannot subject the totality of tradition by which it 
is preconditioned to rational reflection at once nor have an unmediated, non-
interpretative access to the world. What follows from this is that there is no 
neutral, language or tradition-independent foundation upon which ‘true’ or 
justified prejudices can be distinguished from ‘false’ or unjustified ones and thus 
all knowledge remains profoundly partial, fallible and open to revision in 
subsequent contexts of understanding.  
60 
However, in Gadamer’s view, the situatedness of reason does not exclude the 
possibility of or the need for rational reflection. Gadamer has often been 
mistakenly interpreted as endorsing the view that understanding can merely 
illuminate and appropriate the prejudices pregiven to it and thus as downplaying 
the power of critical reflection. As I indicated in studies I and II, this was also 
the core argument of Habermas’s critique of Gadamer (Leiviskä, 2015a, 2015b). 
As I hope to have illustrated, however, Gadamer’s point is not to say that we 
should not try to justify our prejudices or that testing their validity is impossible 
because of our historical situatedness. Rather, one of Gadamer’s major concerns 
in Truth and Method is the question of distinguishing the prejudices by which 
we understand from those that lead us to misunderstandings (Gadamer, 2004, 
298). Gadamer’s answer to this question is dialogue. Namely, although we 
cannot step out of our historical situatedness as a totality, we can test our 
prejudices in dialogical encounters with other historical horizons that present us 
with their independent claims of truth.  
Richard Bernstein (1983, 168) argues that although Gadamer has introduced 
the concept of dialogue in order to explain how claims of truth can be validated, 
he fails to make this form of justification fully explicit. I agree with Bernstein 
that Gadamer’s description of the criteria of a rational dialogue is far vaguer than 
it could be. In my view, however, this has to do with Gadamer’s attempt to de-
methodize rationality. That is, he refrains from providing specific criteria of 
justification in order to avoid the impression that dialogue is a particular method 
or a technique at our disposal that can lead us to certainty or objectivity. 
However, as I have suggested, Gadamer nevertheless does give an explicit 
account of the features of a rational dialogue. Namely, he demonstrates that a 
genuine dialogue requires willingness to listen to the other’s claim of truth, to 
accept it as a potentially valid claim regarding the subject matter and to test one’s 
own prejudices against this claim. In other words, dialogue entails engagement 
in a reflective interplay of question and answer – of giving and asking for reasons 
– that is oriented by the mutual focus on the truth of the subject matter (die
Sache selbst). My argument is that by outlining these features, Gadamer has 
given us a somewhat similar description of the procedural rationality inherent 
in our linguistic practices as Habermas has delineated with his concept of 
communicative rationality. The aforementioned features of dialogical rationality 
are thus such features that humans as linguistic beings rely upon in their 
attempts to understand each other and to justify their claims. Importantly, as 
Bernstein (1983, 163) correctly points out, through this description of dialogical 
rationality, Gadamer has also given us a powerful regulative ideal to orient our 
acts of understanding as well as our practical lives in a more general sense.  
However, the concept of dialogical rationality should not be understood as an 
attempt to provide a transcendental or necessary foundation for our practices. 
Gadamer has continuously emphasized that philosophy must give up the idea of 
61 
an “infinite intellect” (Gadamer, 2004, 457) and “the role of prophet, of 
Cassandra, of preacher” (Gadamer, 2004, xxxiv). Gadamer (1981c, 90; 1998a, 
60) is emphatic that philosophy itself belongs to the level of praxis and thus
cannot dictate the rules or solve the problems of society and politics. This, in my 
view, is the central difference between Gadamer and Habermas – a difference 
that ultimately connects Habermas to foundationalism and Gadamer to 
postfoundationalism. Namely, although Habermas claims to have established a 
clear break with the tradition of transcendental philosophy and to have adopted 
a postfoundational orientation, as Apel (1992), Bernstein (1983) and McCarthy 
(1982) suggest, there is arguably a certain inconsistency in Habermas’s position. 
Habermas continuously insists upon the unavoidability and necessity of the 
counterfactual presuppositions of communicative action and thus appears to 
follow a stronger strategy of justification than he admits (Apel, 1992, 150). In 
other words, whereas Gadamer offers us a practice-immanent interpretation of 
the rational potential involved in understanding, Habermas’s continuous 
concern seems to be to demonstrate that this rationality is not only possible but 
also necessary in the sense that it cannot be refuted without performative 
contradiction (e.g. Habermas, 1990). 
Gadamer’s concept of rationality can also be distinguished from the 
postmodern interpretations of reason involved in Caputo’s and Rorty’s 
philosophies. As indicated in the previous chapter, Rorty (1991a, 23) advocates 
an “ethnocentric” view of justification according to which there is nothing to be 
said about rationality besides the familiar procedures of justification of one’s 
own community. Against this ethnocentrism, Gadamer maintains that although 
dialogical rationality cannot be regarded as ‘foundational’, neither is dialogue a 
procedure of justification characteristic only of ‘our’ community. Rather, from 
Gadamer’s viewpoint, the possibility of dialogical justification is present 
wherever language is used, regardless of the communities to which the 
interlocutors belong. Therefore, the idea that we are only capable of justifying 
ourselves to the members of our own community is utterly foreign to 
Gadamerian thinking.  
At first sight, Caputo’s postmetaphysical rationality appears to bear a greater 
degree of similarity to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, because Gadamer’s concepts of 
phronesis and dialogue can also be understood as attempts to redefine the 
concept of rationality from a postmetaphysical perspective. However, as I have 
demonstrated, Caputo (1987, 213) ultimately reduces rationality to “coping with 
the flux” by which he means the playful activity of disrupting existing paradigms 
and making unorthodox suggestions to them. One can rightly ask what makes 
such non-conformity to existing paradigms particularly rational and is 
conformity to established paradigms thus always necessarily irrational? 
Another central problem with Caputo’s notion of rationality is that it is 
ultimately just a negative attempt to demonstrate what reason is not and from 
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which reason should be liberated, rather than a constructive account of 
rationality. This desire to keep to negative descriptions is common among many 
postmodernist philosophies and, in my view, it significantly reduces their 
philosophical significance. Namely, what they lack is a positive alternative to the 
traditions, ways of thinking and arguments that these postmodern philosophies 
so rigorously criticize. Moreover, it is not clear whether Caputo’s own concept of 
rationality is entirely free of principles. In his “ethics of dissemination”, Caputo 
(1987, 261) invokes an idea of “fair play”, which he defines as the “free play of 
ethicopolitical discourse, a kind of public debate in which we allow 
ethicopolitical reason to play itself out” (ibid.). He further suggests that “The 
essential thing, on this view, is to delimit the power of powerful interests and 
metaphysical ideologies to dominate the talk and arrest the play” (Caputo, 1987, 
262). Is not Caputo here offering principles of rational debate or discourse very 
similar to those provided by Gadamer and Habermas? It seems, as Marsh (1992, 
19) points out, that Caputo is caught in a dilemma of self-contradiction versus
arbitrariness, where he either uses the kind of ratio he aims to avoid or his 
position is vulnerable to arbitrariness.  
Another feature that distinguishes Caputo’s and Rorty’s philosophies from 
Gadamer’s is the concept of truth. As I indicated in the studies, Gadamer 
sustains a regulative truth concept – that is, the truth of the subject matter or 
die Sache selbst – capable of giving direction and motivation to processes of 
understanding (Leiviskä, 2015b; see also Healy, 2007). However, as I argued in 
my defence against Caputo’s critique of Gadamer, this concept of truth does not 
refer to some pregiven, ahistorical essence that is being transmitted in tradition 
through dialogical or dialectical processes of understanding. Rather, for 
Gadamer, the concept of the truth of the subject matter functions as a dialogical 
constraint directing and orienting dialogue partners by providing for them a 
common ground or an ideal reference point that prevents the dissolution of 
understanding into a mere juxtaposition between rival perspectives. From a 
Gadamerian viewpoint, such a concept is indispensable because without it 
understanding would lose its ultimate motivation. Namely, without an idea that 
truth is non-identical to what we currently find as valid for us, there would be 
no reason to take the claims of truth of others seriously, to risk our initial 
presuppositions in the encounters with other horizons or to expand our 
communities of justification. Hence, through rejecting such a regulative notion 
of truth, both Rorty and Caputo lose the critical potential that can be associated 
with Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  
However, as I hope to have demonstrated, although Gadamer maintains that 
truth is the (ideal) goal of all understanding, he does not mean that there is an 
ultimate, objective or foundational truth to be attained. Rather, Gadamer (2004, 
444) insists that situated understanding can only grasp its objects as mediated 
by language and history and therefore as limited and partial. Nevertheless, part 
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of the originality of Gadamer’s hermeneutics lies in the attempt to demonstrate 
that albeit historical, partial and limited, the interpretations generated by 
hermeneutical understanding are anything but trivial or insignificant. They are 
inadequate or secondary only from the viewpoint of the Cartesian desire for 
absolute certainty. Firstly, these interpretations represent the meaning of a 
given subject matter for the interpreter and his or her historical situation and 
thus they have existential rather than epistemological significance. That is, they 
open new horizons of meanings, enable new processes of understanding and 
thus represent a newfound freedom in what has previously been a limitation to 
the interpreter. Secondly, these interpretations also represent an advance in 
understanding in the sense that they have been formed through reflective 
dialogues in which one’s prejudices have been tested against the views of other 
horizons. Therefore, they open deepened, enriched and more justified views into 
the matters at hand.24  
Gadamer’s strong emphasis on the contextuality of understanding creates a 
certain tension between Habermas’s and Gadamer’s positions. As I have 
demonstrated, both authors agree that we need regulative ideals in order to 
secure the openness of understanding and to sustain the distinction between 
facticity and validity. However, whereas Gadamer’s focus is on the historical, 
partial and finite nature of our existence, as Paul Fairfield (2011, 141) points out, 
Habermas still takes flight to a realm of strong idealizations and counterfactuals 
and aims to demonstrate what we ‘could’ agree, if we were not conditioned as we 
are. Consequently, whereas Gadamer emphasizes that it is the tendency to 
search for validity and truth rather than to achieve it that makes us rational and 
human,  Habermas still seeks a method, an epistemology or a standpoint from 
which the justification of our factual agreements could be decided with formal 
certainty (Fairfield, 2011, 151; see also Healy, 2007, 139).  
To summarize my arguments so far: Caputo and Rorty see no danger in 
associating the concepts of rationality and truth either with the procedures of 
justification characteristic of our community (Rorty) or with the constant flux of 
novel interpretations and paradigm shifts (Caputo). In contrast to this, Gadamer 
is persistent in sustaining a notion of dialogical rationality in principle 
recognizable to all human beings and a concept of truth that functions as a 
regulative ideal orienting processes of understanding. At the same time, 
however, Gadamer also preserves the firmly postfoundational orientation of his 
                                                        
24 It is important to acknowledge, however, that Gadamer’s emphasis on the contextual 
and situated nature of understanding does not mean that he endorses the Rortyan idea 
of understanding as merely self-interested or as serving only pragmatic interests. Rather, 
as Gadamer (2004, 311–312) highlights in his re-interpretation of the Aristotelian notion 
of phronesis, understanding cannot be arbitrary either with respect to the subject matter 
or to the given context of interpretation. It is rather codetermined by both, as we can only 
understand and capture the meaning of some subject matter as mediated by our 
particular historical situation. 
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philosophy by giving up the attempt to establish an uncircumventable 
foundation for rationality. Thereby, Gadamer evades some of the inconsistencies 
encountered in Habermas’s project, which have rendered questionable the 
postmetaphysical and postfoundational status of Habermas’s philosophy. 
Hence, in my view, Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be perceived as avoiding some 
of the philosophical limitations of both Habermasian modernism and Caputo’s 
and Rorty’s postmodern philosophies and thus as contributing to the movement 
beyond these approaches. In the following section, I discuss the significance of 
this interpretation of Gadamer for the philosophy of education and particularly 
for overcoming the problematic that has been associated with the modernist and 
postmodernist philosophies of education.  
5.2 The relevance of the studies to the philosophy of education 
In his book The new Significance of Learning, Pádraig Hogan (2010, 34–35) 
argues that education as a practice requires of the philosophy of education more 
than the postmodern critique of existing philosophical paradigms. Although the 
philosophy of education may involve such critique, it also has to include 
constructive suggestions of what a favourable, non-repressive educational 
practice would look like and what would be its central aims and its guiding ideals 
(ibid.). Moreover, as Marianna Papastephanou (2001, 293) suggests, any 
constructive suggestion, critique or intervention ultimately finds its justification 
in some understanding of rationality and truth. Namely, without such notions it 
is impossible to articulate what ‘ought’ to take place in educational practices or 
to prefer one educational model over another. Postmodern philosophies often 
withdraw from making constructive suggestions for fear of resembling once 
again the different forms of ontological and epistemological foundationalism 
that these philosophies initially aimed to distance themselves from. However, I 
agree with Hogan (2010) and Papastephanou (2001) that this withdrawal 
jeopardizes the educational value and significance of these philosophies. 
Namely, education as a practice is deeply intertwined with such questions as 
what we hope from the future society, what direction our humanity ought to take 
and what we can justifiably transmit to future generations. Therefore, leaving 
these questions unanswered and unanalysed is not a viable option for a 
philosophy of education that seeks to have practical relevance.  
However, it has become clear that in constructing the desirable ideals, aims 
and ends of education, it is impossible to bypass the impact that not only 
postmodern philosophies, but also the postmodern condition of our society and 
culture has had on the way we perceive rationality and knowledge. Many of the 
‘grand narratives’ of modernity are undeniably in crisis. They have been 
challenged by a new multiplicity of different identities, worldviews and value 
commitments, which place into question, for instance, the idea of a unified 
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process of rationalization and the conception of a universal or uniform mode of 
rationality. As I have demonstrated, even such modestly objectivistic projects as 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action appear from this perspective as too 
idealized, relying on such assumptions that cannot be achieved from the position 
of a situated inquirer. 
Hence, in my view, what the contemporary philosophy of education requires 
is a philosophical approach that provides such notions of rationality and truth 
from which education can derive its justification and direction and which also 
enable the philosophical critique of existing educational practices. At the same 
time, however, this approach must be able to take into account the limitations of 
rationality and knowledge that follow from the situated and context-dependent 
nature of human existence. In other words, such an approach would have to 
overcome the debility that follows from the relativization or trivialization of the 
concepts of truth and rationality without, however, compromising its 
postfoundational orientation. In this thesis, I have attempted to introduce 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics as one possible alternative for a philosophical 
framework that might meet these requirements and, therefore, contribute to the 
movement beyond the modernism-postmodernism dichotomy within the 
philosophy of education.  
As Bernstein (1983, 163) argues, Gadamer employs his notion of dialogical 
rationality as a regulative ideal or a vision of a society in which there is a practical 
attempt to overcome such forms of communication and practice that prevent the 
realization of the rational potential of humanity. My suggestion is that the 
concept of dialogical rationality could, in a similar vein, function as a regulative 
ideal and as a justificatory basis for educational practices. The notion of 
dialogical rationality represents a form of practical philosophizing or practice-
immanent theorizing and thus it can be understood as clarifying and explicating 
the rational features that are already embedded within our educational 
practices. Hence, if educators and learners themselves recognize and accept 
dialogical rationality as the inherent rationale of education – and the society in 
which such rationality flourishes as their orienting ideal – the concept can be 
perceived as providing an interpretation of the inherent telos of educational 
practices. Such an interpretation provides educators with a guideline upon 
which to construct and based on which to evaluate their actions and modes of 
conduct as educators. It can also inform and remind practitioners of the aims of 
education when educators themselves import such values, beliefs and intentions 
into education that are foreign to this practice and therefore cause distortions 
(e.g. Fairfield, 2011, 113). Moreover, the idea of dialogical rationality could help 
to make explicit those situations where distortive intentions, demands or aims 
are imposed on education from the outside. Therefore, this notion might not 
only provide an orienting ideal for educational practices, but also a point of 
departure for their philosophical reflection and critique. From this perspective, 
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the notion of dialogical rationality would allow the philosophy of education to 
sustain its critical potential and thus to avoid the debility that Carr (1998), 
Hogan (2010), Heyting (2004) and Papastephanou (2001) among others 
associate with some postmodernist philosophies of education. 
However, as I have demonstrated, dialogical rationality is a fallible and 
correctible interpretation of the prospects of education and humanity and 
therefore it should not be identified with the foundationalist aspirations of some 
of the modernist philosophies of education introduced in chapter 1.1. As 
Gadamer’s (2004, 273) critique of the Enlightenment indicates, the attempt to 
establish a secure foundation for knowledge and rationality is in contrast with 
the prejudiced nature of understanding and with the historical character of 
human existence. Moreover, as Gadamer (1999, 36) argues in his essay “On the 
Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics”, the only valid form of philosophy or 
philosophical ethics is one that does not deny its own conditionedness but rather 
takes its conditionedness or questionableness as one of its essential contents. In 
this context, Charles Taylor’s (2015, 62–63) distinction between “strict 
dialectics” and “interpretative dialectics” might be helpful for illuminating the 
difference between foundationalist epistemologies and the more modest form of 
justification or argumentation provided by Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Whereas 
strict dialectics refers to a philosophical system that claims to rely on an 
undeniable starting point, interpretative dialectics remains in a hermeneutical 
circle and uses as its point of departure the interpretations that humans have of 
themselves and their practices (Taylor, 2015, 62–63). However, although 
interpretative dialectics does not assume an Archimedean point of knowledge, it 
still aims to convince us by means of reasoned arguments or, as Taylor (2015, 
63) himself puts it, by the overall plausibility of the interpretation that it gives.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is an excellent example of such mode of argumentation 
or reasoning that is oriented to exercising reasoned judgment not in the context 
of the timeless and unchanging, but of the variable and contingent.  
Hence, although the concept of dialogical rationality might be able to provide 
education with an orienting ideal and a point of departure for the philosophical 
critique of educational practices, it evidently does not eliminate the fact that 
these practices are profoundly effected by history. However, as I hope to have 
demonstrated, being historically effected does not prevent the critique of 
educational practices or exclude the possibility of a productive transformation 
of tradition through education. Rather, it means that education lacks the kind of 
self-transparency that would enable full control over the ideas, practices, skills 
and orientations transmitted through education to future generations. The 
historicity of education thus requires of educators that they recognize the 
partiality and finitude of their outlooks and actions and aim to equip the learners 
with such abilities that enable them to become active participants in the 
reasonable reinterpretation of tradition. In my view, adopting dialogical 
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rationality as the orienting ideal of educational practices thus ultimately means 
fostering such dialogical, situated rationality or phronesis in learners themselves 
and thereby allowing them to take part in the desirable transformation of 
tradition and society.  
In studies I and III, one of my primary aims was to describe the learning 
processes based on dialogical, phronetic rationality (Leiviskä, 2013, 2015a). In 
these processes, the learners acquire a reflective perspective on the tradition that 
they inherit through education and thus on the very presuppositions that orient 
their learning. In Gadamer’s (2004, 301) words, they obtain “effective historical 
consciousness”. As stated earlier, because of the historicity of human existence, 
attaining such a critical perspective requires encountering other, previously 
unknown horizons and worlds of thought and action. Through their 
unfamiliarity and unexpectedness, these horizons give rise to such experiences 
of negation that allow the learners to foreground their own historical 
presuppositions, to examine their historically structured nature and to gain 
awareness of the finitude and fallibility of their prevailing knowledge. This 
awareness results in the increased openness of learners to other horizons and 
thus to further experiences.  
However, as I have emphasized, encountering other horizons and learning 
from them does not mean unquestioningly accepting the claims of truth of these 
horizons. Rather, it means entering into a common, dialogical search for truth 
with them and testing one’s own presuppositions against the truth claims that 
these horizons present. In other words, learning requires sacrificing one’s 
current partiality for the sake of the truth of the subject matter and reaching 
beyond one’s current being towards greater universality (Gadamer, 2004, 15). 
This kind of learning gives rise to new, more justified, enriched and deepened 
interpretations of the subject matters in question and it also opens for the 
learner new horizons of meaning and new possibilities of understanding. 
However, these interpretations achieved in learning will inevitably be overcome 
by subsequent processes of learning, as the learner’s horizon expands and shifts 
as he or she understands and learns. For Gadamer, learning is therefore not a 
process of approaching a pregiven or pre-existent truth or full autonomy from 
historical prejudices. Rather, processes of learning must be regarded as 
fundamentally open-ended and unfinishable, as no interpretation of any subject 
matter is ever an exhaustive or a final one, but there is always more to learn and 
experience. Gadamer (2004, 8) himself refers to these unfinishable learning 
processes with the notion of Bildung. The essence of this Gadamerian concept, 
in my view, is that it is the never-ending pursuit of truth and knowledge that 
makes us human, not the discovery of truth itself, as the latter remains an 
unattainable ideal for finite human existence. However, unlike Caputo, Rorty 
and many other postmodern philosophers suggest, despite its unattainability, 
truth remains a necessary guiding ideal for processes of learning, as giving up 
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such an ideal would ultimately mean giving up the rational motivation to 
overcome one’s current partiality. 
From a Gadamerian perspective, engaging in the kind of learning processes 
described above is crucial as it prepares the learners for such citizenship upon 
which open, tolerant and dialogical societies are based. These societies are those 
in which a continuous practical attempt exists to realize the features involved in 
dialogical rationality – features such as openness to communication and 
learning, willingness to offer and receive criticism and to test one’s convictions 
against opposing values and opinions (Fairfield, 2011, 150). However, as 
Fairfield (ibid.) indicates, adopting a hermeneutical perspective on rationality 
and society means accepting that actual, historical conditions always remain far 
from the ideal. Therefore, the discursive or dialogical practices of even the most 
open and reasonable societies are not only symmetrically structured and 
oriented to reciprocity, but also agonistic, rhetorical, persuasive and power-
seeking (ibid.). Human praxis never reaches the ideal state of complete 
rationality or reasonableness. However, from a Gadamerian viewpoint, this 
makes the continuous practical attempt to realize such rationality even more 
important.   
As a conclusion, I suggest that Gadamer’s hermeneutics opens an 
illuminating philosophical perspective on education as a practice that is deeply 
concerned about the future and the prospects of humanity and ultimately about 
the ‘good’ of human life. Therefore, Gadamer’s hermeneutics also allows 
recognizing that education requires cogent conceptions of rationality and truth 
from which to derive its justification and orientation and upon which to base the 
philosophical critique of educational practices. However, as a profoundly 
historical, practice-immanent mode of theorizing and philosophizing, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not seek to provide a foundational justification 
for educational practices. What philosophical hermeneutics provides is a 
historical, fallible and correctible interpretation of the inherent rational 
potential of education and learning – an interpretation that seeks to convince us 
by the overall plausibility that it gives (Taylor, 2015, 63). The relevance of this 
interpretation is that it might help the educators and learners themselves to 
reflect upon their actions and beliefs in different educational contexts and 
settings and thus to participate in the continuous betterment of their practices.  
In the light of the focus of this study, however, the primary significance of 
this Gadamerian interpretation is that it represents an important contribution 
to the movement beyond the unproductive modernism-postmodernism 
opposition within the philosophy of education. Namely, while Gadamer’s 
philosophy refrains from the foundationalist aspirations of the modernist 
philosophies of education, it also avoids the kind of debility that has been 
associated with the withdrawal of the postmodernist approaches from providing 
a justificatory basis for educational practices. In this sense, Gadamer’s 
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hermeneutics offers a more defensible warrant for educational theory and 
practice than that provided by either the modernist or the postmodernist 
philosophies of education discussed in this thesis.  
5.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
In this chapter, I discuss some of the limitations associated with this thesis – 
particularly with its scope and perspective – and also outline some directions for 
future research. One of the limitations has to do with the focus of this work on 
the modernism-postmodernism debate. Namely, adopting this debate as my 
framework inevitably restricted my examination to certain epistemological 
features of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, thus leaving some other important 
dimensions of his philosophical project in the background. These dimensions 
involve, among other things, the ontological and ethical aspects of the concept 
of understanding. Namely, for Gadamer, understanding is not only a mode of 
justification, but also an ontological mode of being and a way of relating to the 
world and other people. When perceived from an ontological perspective, the 
process of understanding appears even less controllable and subject-centred 
than from an epistemological viewpoint. When Gadamer (2004, 484) speaks in 
the ontological tenor, he emphasizes the way we are “drawn into” an event of 
tradition and language which rather “plays itself” than is played by its 
participants. Perceived ontologically, understanding is therefore something that 
“happens to us over and above our wanting and doing”, as Gadamer (2004, xxvi) 
puts it. Moreover, the relevance of the ‘other’ in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not 
restricted to the role given to this other in a justificatory dialogue. Rather, as 
Gadamer (2004, 354) states, in a dialogue two people are bound together by a 
“moral bond” or a dialectical reciprocity. This bond is based upon the profound 
recognition of the otherness of the other and of the possible legitimacy of the 
other’s claims. According to Gadamer (2004, 292), only such bond and 
reciprocity between two people ultimately enables the “miracle of 
understanding, which is not a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in a 
common meaning”. Illuminating these ontological and ethical dimensions of 
understanding was beyond the current focus of this thesis and therefore their 
examination remains a task for future research. 
Another issue closely related to the modernism-postmodernism distinction 
is the objectivism-relativism dichotomy that appears on the pages of this thesis. 
Due to the restricted space, I was not able to properly address the difficulties and 
ambiguities associated with these concepts in the context of study II where these 
notions are particularly employed (see Leiviskä, 2015b). The use of these 
concepts is evidently not always problematic or misleading – however, it is 
important to acknowledge that there are different forms and varying degrees of 
both objectivism and relativism. For instance, both Caputo and Rorty reject the 
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version of relativism that takes every belief to be as good as any other and Rorty 
additionally refutes such relativism according to which the notion of truth has 
as many meanings as there are procedures of justification (Caputo, 2013; Rorty, 
1991a, 23; 1993, 328). However, both of these philosophies are relativistic from 
the viewpoint of Bernstein’s (1983, 8) definition, which associates the concept of 
relativism with the kind of postfoundationalism that accepts the 
incommensurability of different language games. Moreover, as I demonstrated 
in studies I and II, from a more ‘objectivistic’ perspective, Gadamer himself can 
be perceived as representing a form of relativism (Leiviskä, 2015a, 2015b). 
Namely, among other things, from a Gadamerian perspective, interpretations 
can be justified only against other particular interpretations instead of by 
appealing to some ahistorical or tradition-independent principles or 
foundations. One important viewpoint on the concept of relativism is also 
presented by Bernstein (1983, 19) and Fairfield (2011, 228). According to them, 
relativism remains a plausible category only from the perspective of a Cartesian 
absolutist who maintains that certain, indubitable knowledge is possible. If, 
however, we accept the hermeneutical standpoint and give up the quest for 
certainty, relativism ceases to appear as a major threat, because all knowledge 
then becomes more or less uncertain, fallible and partial (ibid.). This last insight 
is perhaps also the reason why Gadamer himself remains somewhat indifferent 
in regard to the threat of relativism.  
The concept of objectivism – that is, the idea that there is some permanent, 
ahistorical framework to which we can appeal in determining the nature of such 
concepts as rationality and truth (Bernstein, 1983, 8) – also raises some 
problematic, especially when it is used to refer to Habermas’s philosophical 
programme. Namely, although Habermas declares himself to be a modernist, he 
nevertheless argues to have built his philosophy upon strictly postfoundational 
and fallible premises (e.g. Habermas, 1984, 1990). It is evident that Habermas’s 
philosophy can be distinguished from the forms of objectivism such as Cartesian 
absolutism or Kantian transcendentalism in its original sense. Nevertheless, as 
I have argued, several critical reviews of Habermas’s philosophy have made 
explicit the internal contradictions of his philosophical programme and thus 
raised the question whether his philosophy can be regarded as genuinely 
postfoundational (Apel, 1992; Bernstein, 1983; McCarthy, 1982). From this 
viewpoint, Habermas can be argued to endorse at least a weak or a modest form 
of objectivism in a Bernsteinian (1983, 8) sense. In fact, as Bernstein (1983, 12) 
rightly points out, this kind of weak objectivism remains the only plausible form 
of objectivism in contemporary philosophy because “the dominant temper of our 
age is fallibilistic”. The viable option for us is thus between a sophisticated form 
of fallibilistic objectivism and a nonsubjective conception of relativism (ibid.).  
Addressing these issues here is important because particularly relativism has 
– perhaps for the wrong reasons – become a slogan for ‘bad philosophizing’ and
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the concept is too often utilized to label entire philosophical programmes as 
unproductive or disadvantageous. Therefore, it is important to aim towards 
philosophical language use that relies less upon such conceptual dichotomies 
that potentially give a misleading image of the philosophical field and the 
differences between the rival philosophical approaches. Hence, one prospect for 
future research concerns the further examination of the possibility of 
overcoming the binary distinctions between modernism and postmodernism as 
well as objectivism and relativism. Surpassing these distinctions requires finding 
new ways of describing the differences in emphasis between the philosophical 
approaches. Moreover, it involves understanding in a different way such 
philosophically central concepts as rationality, truth and knowledge. Gadamer’s 
philosophy can indeed itself be understood as a form of such overcoming. 
Namely, Gadamer (2004) emphasizes that the concepts of rationality, truth and 
knowledge that he introduces in his philosophy have a quite different meaning 
and significance than the understanding of these notions established in the 
tradition of the Enlightenment and in the modern sciences. In Gadamer’s 
philosophy, these concepts primarily relate to the way in which we as human 
beings experience the world, learn from each other and thus become 
transformed in the process. Although I have already illuminated these 
dimensions of Gadamer’s philosophy in the studies and thus contributed to the 
movement beyond the ambiguous conceptual distinctions described above, 
there is still more work to be done in this area. “Interpretation is always on the 
way”, as Gadamer (1981c, 105) himself states.  
Another significant prospect for future research concerns the educational 
implications of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Namely, although the educational 
contributions of the studies of this thesis illuminate important aspects of the 
relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the philosophy of education, forming a 
unified educational approach or a comprehensive hermeneutical theory of 
education on the basis of Gadamer’s philosophy requires further development of 
the themes introduced in the studies. Particularly Gadamer’s later developments 
based on his reappropriation of Aristotelian practical philosophy could open 
fruitful possibilities for illuminating the social and political dimensions of 
Gadamer’s philosophy and for elucidating the relevance of these dimensions to 
the philosophy of education. Another interesting possibility concerns the issue 
of hermeneutic teaching. An important undertaking for future research is to 
decipher what kind of teaching is appropriate when the aims of education are 
understood in terms of Gadamer’s concepts of phronesis and dialogical 
rationality and whether there are – or even can be – any philosophically 
determinable methods or techniques of teaching for furthering these aims. 
Namely, Gadamer (e.g. 2004, xxv) has continuously emphasized that his 
endeavour is to explicate the conditions of understanding rather than to 
elaborate methodical procedures. This implies that his hermeneutics does not 
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necessarily provide a straightforward model for developing an account of 
hermeneutic teaching. Furthermore, especially in his writings on practical 
philosophy, Gadamer (1998a, 59) emphasizes that it is not the task of philosophy 
to find the correct means for achieving certain ends, but rather both discovering 
these means and justifying the ends ultimately remains a task for the 
practitioners themselves. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to examine the potential of Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
to contribute to the overcoming of the unproductive modernism-
postmodernism dichotomy in the philosophy of education. Furthermore, the 
study also attempted to elucidate the possibility of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to 
offer a more defensible warrant for educational theory and practice than that 
provided by the modernist and postmodernist philosophies of education 
discussed in this thesis. As indicated earlier, providing such a warrant requires 
responding to both a) the modernist demand for cogent notions of rationality 
and truth; and b) the postmodernist requirement to take into account the 
inescapable contextuality of rationality and knowledge. The aforementioned 
aims were pursued in the study by examining Gadamer’s hermeneutics in 
relation to some of the prominent representatives of modernism and 
postmodernism and by establishing that Gadamer’s philosophy succeeds in 
overcoming some of the major philosophical problems and limitations 
associated with these stances. The approaches studied were Jürgen Habermas’s 
modernist critical theory and John Caputo’s and Richard Rorty’s postmodern 
philosophies. The study primarily focused on the Gadamerian concepts of 
dialogical rationality and the truth of the subject matter (die Sache selbst), which 
represent an attempt to redefine the notions of rationality and truth in a 
postfoundational and yet nonrelativistic manner. 
The study suggested that the Gadamerian concept of dialogical rationality 
can be understood as representing a form of justification that is embedded 
within the dialogical structure of everyday language use and is thus in principle 
recognizable to all language users. The concept of dialogical rationality functions 
as a procedural criterion for testing and justifying historically constituted 
presuppositions and therefore this concept enables refuting – or at least 
significantly weakening – the charges of relativism and conservatism directed to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Moreover, through describing the inherent telos of 
language use towards understanding and agreement, this concept of rationality 
also gives a powerful regulative ideal to orient understanding and our practical 
lives in a more general sense.  
It was argued in the study that the concept of dialogical rationality 
circumvents both the foundationalist tendencies encountered in Habermas’s 
modernist philosophy and the postmodern trivialization of reason associated 
with Caputo’s and Rorty’s philosophies. Although there are significant 
similarities in Gadamer’s and Habermas’s concepts of rationality, while 
Gadamer’s dialogical rationality is strictly postfoundational, the nature of 
Habermas’s communicative rationality is much more ambiguous. Namely, 
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although Habermas argues to have rejected foundationalism, his indebtedness 
to strategies of justification characteristic of Kantian transcendental philosophy 
has been illustrated in many critical reviews of his philosophical project (Apel, 
1992; Bernstein, 1983; McCarthy, 1982). The features of dialogical rationality 
described above also distinguish this concept from Caputo’s and Rorty’s 
understandings of rationality. From a Gadamerian viewpoint, Caputo’s 
postmetaphysical view of rationality as nonconformism to established 
paradigms fails to explicate what makes such nonconformism particularly 
rational and how it prevents the arbitrariness of interpretation. Moreover, 
Rorty’s ethnocentric concept of justification remains vulnerable to the radical 
incommensurability of different language games and it also problematically 
raises the mode of justification characteristic of one’s own community over those 
of other cultures and societies. 
Similar conclusions were drawn from Gadamer’s concept of the truth of the 
subject matter (die Sache selbst). For Gadamer, this concept of truth represents 
a regulative ideal or a dialogical constraint orienting dialogical processes of 
understanding. It motivates the interlocutors to reach beyond their historically 
pregiven presuppositions and to test them in relation to the truth claims of 
others. This concept of truth thus prevents the dissolution of understanding into 
a mere juxtaposition between different interpretations. Although this 
Gadamerian truth concept bears a certain resemblance to the Habermasian idea 
of the context-transcending nature of validity claims, Gadamer nevertheless 
places a much stronger emphasis on the contextual and situated outcomes of 
factual processes of understanding. In contrast to Gadamer, Habermas sustains 
a strong dichotomy between factual discourses and ideal contexts of 
justification, thus contradicting the always already historically and linguistically 
embedded nature of understanding and argumentation. As for Caputo and 
Rorty, they reject the concept of truth as the ideal aim of inquiry. From 
Gadamer’s perspective, this undermining of truth has undesirable consequences 
for understanding. Namely, without a regulative truth concept, understanding 
becomes vulnerable not only to arbitrariness but also to dogmatism as the 
inquirers lose their rational motivation to challenge their pregiven beliefs and 
convictions and to expand their communities of justification.  
These findings were utilized in the study to illustrate the relevance of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the philosophy of education and, more specifically, 
to elucidate how Gadamer’s philosophy might contribute to the overcoming of 
the philosophical problems associated with the modernist and postmodernist 
philosophies of education. Firstly, it was argued that Gadamer’s concepts of 
rationality and truth can be understood as providing orienting ideals for 
education and learning and also as functioning as points of departure for the 
philosophical critique of educational practices. In this sense, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics avoids the debility often associated with the postmodernist 
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philosophies of education that refrain from making constructive suggestions 
concerning the aims and ideals of education and from providing a justificatory 
basis for educational practices. Secondly, however, it was suggested that 
Gadamer’s concepts of rationality and truth are intimately interlinked with the 
awareness of the profoundly historical, situated and context-dependent nature 
of human existence. In this sense, these Gadamerian concepts cannot be 
identified with the modernist attempt to provide uncircumventable foundations 
for educational theory and practice. Rather, these concepts can be understood 
as fallible and correctible interpretations of the rational potential involved in the 
practices of education and learning. By explicating this potential and thus 
making it available for the practitioners’ self-reflection, these concepts enable 
educators and learners to participate in the continuous betterment of existing 
practices and conditions. By redefining the educationally crucial concepts of 
rationality and truth from a postfoundational and practice-immanent 
perspective, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics thus also avoids the major 
philosophical difficulties associated with the foundationalist aspirations of the 
modernist philosophies of education. The conclusion drawn from these findings 
was that Gadamer’s hermeneutics succeeds in offering a stronger, more 
defensible justification for educational theory and practice than that provided by 
either the modernist philosophies of education or the postmodernist educational 
standpoints addressed in this study. Thereby, Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
contributes to the movement beyond the unproductive modernism-
postmodernism debate in the philosophy of education.  
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